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ABSTRACT

An abstract for the thesis of Stephen Frederick Anderson for the Master
of Arts in Histoty presented November 4, 1994.

Title: Establishing US Militaty Government: Law and Order in Southern
Bavaria 1945.

In May 1945, United States Militaty Government (MG)
detachments arrived in assigned areas of Bavaria to launch the
occupation. By the summer of 1945, the US occupiers became the
ironical combination of stern victor and watchful master. Absolute
control gave way to the "direction" of German authority. For this process
to succeed, MG officials had to establish a stable, clearly defined and
fundamentally strict environment in which German officials would begin
to exercise token control.
The early occupation was a highly unstable stage of chaos, fear
and confusing objectives. MG detachments and the reconstituted
German authorities performed complex tasks with many opportunities
for failure. In this environment, a crucial MG obligation was to help
secure law and order for the defeated and dependent German populace
whose previously existing authorities had been removed. Germans
themselves remained largely peaceful, yet unforeseen actors such as
liberated "Displaced Persons" rose to menace law and order. The threat of
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criminal disorder and widespread black market activity posed great risks
in the early occupation.
This thesis demonstrates how US MG established its own
authority in the Munich area in 1945, and how that authority was
applied and challenged in the realm of criminal law and order. This study
explores themes not much researched. Thorough description of local
police reestablishment or characteristic crime issues hardly exists. There
is no substantial local examination of the relationship between such
issues and the early establishment of MG authority. Local MG records
housed in the Bayertsches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Bavarian Main State
Archives) provide most of the primacy sources. This study also relies
heavily on German-language secondacy sources.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of this year, four years after the German
Wiedervereinigung, or unification, the United States symbolically ended

its significant role in the occupation of Germany at a Berlin ceremony.
In the same period, however, the US and its current United Nations allies
find themselves in other foreign lands under chaotic conditions and
complex political circumstances. In a global juggling act, US forces are
obligated-- for better or worse-- to restore or establish governments,
peace or both in Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti. Even so, some argue, these
selective commitments are not enough: in still other lands US forces
could also be restoring "order" but are not-- yet.
A critical role of US forces these days is not to commit to a long
series of campaigns of conquest, but rather to reestablish and maintain
order so that new chances and changes can be created. Recently, it
appears, American forces have truly become the "world's policemen."
Securing law and order has become the understood mission of US forces
wherever US interests are affected.
For the US Military Government detachments blazing into Bavaria
on the US Seventh Army's back in May 1945, the immediate objective
was vety much the same as it for US authorities today. The maintenance
of order and the establishment of authority were pressing goals, there-
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establishment of a "democratic" form of government the eventual goal.
The situation in 1945 was also vecy much different. A difficult and
damaging world war was coming to a close. For years Americans had
been waging war against a Germany they had learned to despise. With
the German capitulation of May 1945, however, Americans were suddenly
forced to administer and care for their bitter foe. On their part, Germans
had endured and lost a long war at profound and devastating costs to
their highly developed society. German politics, the economy, honorable
and infamous institutions alike would be radically altered. National
psyche, beliefs and traditions would never obey the same impulses as
before. Whether 1994 or 1945, undertaking the role of occupier or
assuming that of the occupied involves severe and problematic duties.
Like its allies in other parts of Germany,1 US Militaty Government
detachments arriving in a recently overrun area had one principal
mission: to dictate the vanquished German foe. In May of 1945, US
authorities arrived in the defeated and debilitated areas of Munich and
Southern Bavaria and "hit the ground running" to dictate all
developments and influence evecy initiative.

1The British held most of Northern and Northwestern Germany,
the Russians all of Eastern Germany, and the Americans Southern,
Central, and parts of Southwest Germany. Free French Forces held areas
in Southwest Germany. With the establishment of official occupation
zones in the fall of 1945, France received more of Southwest German
territoty, including Stuttgart, where US occupation authorities had
already begun to establish themselves. The US gained the Bremen
enclave as an outlet to the sea in the north. The Allied zonal agreements
had many minor effects on the German map in addition to the eventual
significant split between east and west and elilnination of vast Prussian
lands. Bavaria, for example, lost the Southern Rhineland territocy it had
held since the Napoleanic era.
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The early occupation was a direct "extension of war" --by
preseiVing victocy and consummating military aims. As in wartime,
extreme conditions demanded that expediency and security determined
actions. The immediate goals were direct and urgent. The prominent
political occu patton goals most recognized today were not yet clearly
formulated, inevitable, or even intended. "Denazification" and
"Democratization" were not foremost in the minds of US Army or Military
Government officers. The Marshall Plan and the creation of a stable,
economically self-sufficient Germany as a bulwark against the
Communist Bloc were a long way off. The future course of the occupation
would be vecy much influenced by the degree to which commanding
authority could be established.
Still, the war had indeed ended. US MG2 was directed to modify its
martial objectives in the same early stage of the occupation. MG could
not "rule" as victor indefmitely. Complete control promptly gave way to
··direction." For proper direction to succeed, MG had to frrst set up a
stable, clearly defined and fundamentally strict relationship in which
German officials would begin to exercise token au thortty under strict US
supervision. US occupiers soon became the ironical combination of stem
victor and custodial ruler. This status required certain responsibilities
and obligations to the defeated and suddenly dependent German
populace whose previously eXisting authorities had been removed.
For both occupier and occupied, the early occupation was a highly
unstable period full of chaos, fear and confusing objectives. Evecy day,
2The abbreviation MG (Military Government) will be used
throughout this study.
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MG detachments performed a complex juggling act with every
opportunity for failure. MG officers were forced to choose between three
different sets of directives. Many times detachment officers feuded with
each other or collided with tactical army colleagues. Local circumstances
changed almost daily. Massive redeployment began immediately after the
capitulation in May and greatly complicated every Military Government
detachment's ability to pursue a clear local policy. Most local German
infrastructure was completely destroyed or severely damaged and required
massive reconstruction simply to get the community "up and running."
Germans trusted no one and feared repression daily from their American
occupiers, former forced laborers, concentration camp inmates, and
revenge-seeking fellow citizens. Germans appointed to posts frequently
lost their positions in the face of ever more s trtngen t political
requirements delineated in the denazification directives. "Displaced
Persons," the various foreign nationals liberated from forced labor or
concentration camps, required immediate assistance and guidance. MG
wrestled with all sorts of such dilemmas not only in Southern Bavaria,
but throughout the US Zone of occupation. The problems were immense,
and the need to overcome them immediate. Crucial future developments,
directions and successes were being determined.
In this environment, the threat of criminal disorder posed great
risks to US and German authorities. Major breakdowns of law and order
could severely impede the overall progress and intended aims of the
occupation. Without the proper level of stability the broad political
occupation agendas understood and praised today would have been
doomed to the planning stages much longer than necessary. As things
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turned out, critical criminal issues were controlled just enough to cany
on -- at times just barely enough.
A major task of MG and the first reestablished German officials
was providing "public safety," the control of threatening violent acts as
well as theft and economic crimes. The challenges were varied and not
always expected. Germans themselves remained surprisingly peaceful,
but unforeseen actors rose to menace law and order. Many of the
lawbreakers had experienced more than six years of brutal oppression
and warfare. Among them, certain Displaced Persons turned out to be
the most violent, persistent and intimidating lawbreakers. Others, such
as Gls or German housewives became (for drastically different reasons)
small-scale smugglers and petty operators, part of the hordes of minor
black marketeers. MG's and the Germans authorities' early confrontation
of these bewildering issues was in some respects surprisingly successful
and in others prophetically dubious.
Using these considerations as the framework, this thesis seeks to
raise and answer the question of how the occupation got underway. How
did US MG establish authority and direct law and order in a given area,
and what were the challenges? This study documents early MG operation
in Southern Bavaria-- mainly in Munich-- and observes two general
themes: 1) how MG established its own authority; and 2) how that
authority was applied and challenged in the realm of criminal law and
order. These two dependent themes above correspond to two general parts
of this study. The frrst part comprises Chapters Two and Three. Chapter
Two provides background on the development of MG -- planning,
personnel, operation, goals -- while Chapter Three examines the
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establishment of MG control, indicates problems MG detachments faced,
and illustrates how Germans were or were not allowed an early role. The
second part contains the last three chapters. Chapter Four reveals how
MG clarified its new order to Germans, and how MG allowed German
police a role in the new order. Chapter Five presents crime issues typical
of postwar chaos -- plundering, violent crimes, and the problem posed by
the so-called Displaced Persons -- whereas Chapter Six evaluates the
complex black market situation.
The scale of the study is restricted. I focus on a particular region,
explore specific local issues, and limit the scope to a rather brief and
chaotic but critical period. Historical works stressing local developments
have been proven essential, and provide the inspiration for my research.
Regional analyses of the Nazi period3 have shown how much local
operations and events reveal about broad policy, overall reaction, and the
tangible success of policy and purpose. John Gimbel's comprehensive
1961 study of Marburg4 was one of the first works that brought this
3william Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The
Experience of a Single German Town 1922-1945, rev. ed. (New York:
Franklin Watts, 1984); Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Walter Rinderle and
Bernard Norling, The Nazi Impact on a German Village (Lexington, KY:
The University Press of Kentucky, 1993).
4John Gimbel, A German Community under German American
Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1961). See also: Rebecca Boehling, "German Municipal Self-Government
and the Personnel Policies of the Local U.S. Military Government in
Three Major Cities of the U.S. Zone of Occupation: Frankfurt, Munich,
and Stuttgart," Archiv fiir Sozialgeschichte, 25 (1985): 333-383; Lutz
Niethammer, "Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen
Verwaltungstradition und politischen Parteien in Bayem 1945,"
Vierteliahreshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 15.2 (1967): 153-210; Edward N.
Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977); Hans Woller, Gesellschaft
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beneficial level of discernment to the subject of the US occupation. The
local study can reveal many fresh aspects by following how an MG
detachment performed habitually-- in spite of and according to the
policy, handbooks and discourse.
Through the "lens" of local emphasis, this thesis aims to
demonstrate how the process of MG was performed and how Germans
were affected by it. This theme corresponds to the time period I have
chosen. In the first few months of the occupation, the fundamentals of
authority were laid almost solely on the local level in Western Germany.
This was a critical challenging stage of incubation for modem Germany,
but also for US MG, US occupation leaders and the future route of US
foreign policy. In this atmosphere, Americans began to learn the lessons
and study the messages necessacy for assuming the decisive
international role the US is charged with today. Although the MG
experience throughout the US Zone of occupation shared similar traits,
it was on the local level in the early occupation that the fundamentals of

authority were laid.
I attempt to reveal how US MG succeeded, failed, muddled through
and managed in its first days in one region of Southern Bavaria.
Although I provide broader background information on my subject, I
admit that some of the following narrative might appear to lack a
framework to the reader unfamiliar with the occupation. At the risk of
seeming episodic, the text details many spontaneous initiatives,
und Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Die Region Ansbach
und Furth (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1968). For an insightful and dramatic
personal account of local conditions, see: Saul K. Padover, Experiment
in Germany (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946).
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unforeseen problems, practical proposals, relentless challenges, and
expedient solutions, all within a very unstable period. It shows how a
process was begun, not how it ended. It does not attempt to give the
whole picture, but rather wants to give a representative view of the period
and subject on a smaller but hopefully lucid framework. The larger
political aims, goals, and decisions -- the broad strokes and the grand
peaks-- are presented in suitably extensive studies.5 These classically
comprehensive analyses are unmistakably invaluable. They provide the
proper framework and basis, and make investigations such as mine
possible.
Part of the problem of "fmding a framework" lies in the fact that
this work explores many themes not much researched or described. 6
Thorough consideration of local police reestablishment, characteristic
crime issues, or Displaced Persons hardly exists, in German or English.
There is no substantial local examination of the relationship between
5Amertcans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in
Germany and Japan, 1944-1952, ed. Robert Wolf (Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984); Eugene
Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1959); John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: The Politics
and the Military, 1945-49 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961);
Die Kapitulation von 1945 und der Neubeginn in Deutschland, ed.
Winfried Becker (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, 1987); Edward H. Litchfield
and Associates, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1953); Harold Zink, The United States in-Germany
1944-45 (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1957). For emphasis on the tactical
army's role in the occupation, see: Franklin M. Davis Jr., Come as a
Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany 1945-49
(New York: Macmillan, 1967); Earl F. Ziemke, Army Historical Series: The
U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Army Center of Military History, 1975).
6Where these issues receive any treatment at all I attempt to note
accordingly in the footnotes.
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any of these issues and the early establishment of MG authority, in the
rural or urban arena. There is a mountain of material to cover in these
and other areas. I hope this work begins to fill some gaps.
The lack of comprehensive primacy sources is a problem to
overcome for such an unstable period. Copies of local MG records -microfll.med and housed in the Bayertsches Hauptstaatsarchiv -- are
naturally the most useful records for much of what is explored here. The
records are far from ideal, however. They are full of flaws and regularly
recapitulate in imprecise terms, identifying groups and problems rather
than personalities and explanations. Nevertheless, some issues in these
pages can only be explored through such records. Black marketeers, for
example, did not keep records of their methods, nor did robber bands
generally record their exploits. Crippled by missing, imprisoned or fired
officials and faced with drastic material shortages, local police were
unable to maintain normally thorough records. MG records are the most
inclusive sources available. The material includes not simply MG officers'
observations but also the summation of material provided by Germans
responsible for reporting to MG. Apart from the MG records and
contemporacy newspapers, I use secondacy sources from German
historians for the bulk of this work. I hope this approach enabled me to
offer some

altematt~e

to the prevailing English-language sources.

CHAPTER II

US MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY OCCUPATION

US Militacy Government detachments held deeply significant
responsibilities and were to carcy out highly problematic tasks. The early
role of the MG detachment was that of strict disciplinarian and harsh
policeman, but would soon evolve into that of guiding master and
invaluable patron. Throughout the early oc.cupation the MG detachment
remained the source that tactical US militacy, Germans and Displaced
Persons alike would turn to for help for a myriad of problems influenced
by local, regional and international decisions and conditions. MG was
created to address evecy possible challenge arising from the brutal war
and a sometimes equally tiring occupation.
Along with the endless string of dilemmas, MG performance on
eve:ry level and in every region was burdened with a succession of
alterations: clashing orders from tactical commanders; changeable
policies from above; alternating directives from within; conflicting
personnel types; continuous personnel redeployment and scarcities, and
changeable loyalties, needs and deeds from native Germans, refugees,
and Displaced Persons alike.
In the early stage of the occupation, MG was most concerned with
controlling the situation, and getting things to work again. The proper
political goals to pursue would be honed later. The drastic conditions,
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intense pressures, unclear policies and inconsistent quality of the
detachments meant that MG in a given area could vary widely in
performance. Local Germans, cut off from the rest of their society,
attempted at times to test the MG officers' limits and initiate their own
reforms and governments. Few of these were allowed, and those that were
did not last long.
This work is not a comprehensive analysis of the broad
organizational and political factors influencing the US occupation of
Germany. Nevertheless, suitable background on US MG is essential
before turning to more specific consideration of MG's role. This chapter
provides the framework for the rest of the work by offering a brief
breakdown of MG's purpose, organization and general experience in the
early occupation.

ORIGINS OF US MILITARY GOVERNMENT

In wartime planning for the occupation, the experience of the postWorld War I Rhineland occupation was a decisive factor. It was clear to
the War Department that the "tactical," or combat troops then assigned
the tasks of occupation were not well trained or suited for their role. As a
result of these considerations, the War Department added to the four
"classic" staff divisions in the regular army -- Personnel, Intelligence,
Operations, Supply-- an agency specifically for MG. This fifth staff
section, Civil Affairs, or G-5, was intended to better address the special
problems that arose after hostilities ceased. The organizational
foundation for this new staff was the existing administration for military
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police. The Provost Marshal General had the responsibility of training
MG personnel. I

MILITARY GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

From 1943 on, MG and general staff administrative personnel
received specific training in various schools in the US and England.
Recruits for MG came from the regular army as well as civilian life. The
professional militacy men recruited for MG generally had "little
knowledge ofGerman·language, culture, or histocy and even less aptitude
for civilian administration .... But they were at the top of the
hierarchy. "2 Civilian recruits specially trained for MG held various
professional positions in the fields of higher education, journalism, law,
and labor. Despite their previous civilian or MG training, many recruits
were not given positions in which they could exercise their acquired
skills. Knowledge of German was preferred, but was rare among
American-born MG personnel because of the lack of time necessary for
preparation. 3
Two groups made up the specially trained MG officers. In one group
were the technical and administrative experts. In the other group were
emigrants from German-speaking areas together with first and second

1Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 157-58.
2soehling, 334.
3soehling 340; Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 160.
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generation German-Americans. This second group acted mainly as
language, cultural, and political experts and served in political
intelligence, the public safety, or information control branches. Few of
these men were career officers or not to attain higher ranks, 4 as the
higher ranks were more open to MG officers who came from army stock
but in many cases were less qualified for MG tasks.

PURPOSE, OPERATION, AND PLANNING

The initial mission of MG was limited. MG comprised a separate
organization of specialists, yet in the early wartime phase of the
occupation MG belonged and remained subordinate to the tactical army.
Busy tactical army staffs were much more concerned with exigent
milita:ry operations than unfamiliar MG objectives. In selling the
incorporation of MG to reluctant combat staffs, the Provost Marshal
General, Allen W. Gullion, described two restrained objectives for MG:5
First, to help bring the war to a successful termination; second
and entirely subordinate to the first consideration, to further the
welfare of the people of the occupied territo:ry . . . . What matters
most is that the commanding general in any field of operations be
given as complete control as possible over all the elements that
must enter into the calculations.
During wartime operations General Eisenhower, although supreme
milita:ry governor, entrusted his authority to generals commanding the

4Boehling 340.
5Allen W. Gullion (Provost Marshal General), "Milita:ry
Government," Coast Artillery Journal, 86 (1943): 2, qtd. in Niethammer,
"Besatzungsmacht" 159.
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various army groups. Eisenhower exercised his power only to make major
decisions and to scrutinize when absolutely necessary. Nevertheless,
neither the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF),
the combined English-American high command, or the Army groups
directly commanded MG in the early phase. Direction of MG rested with
the individual armies themselves, but they controlled MG only carelessly
and inconsistently.6
The incorporation of MG staffs in the General staff structure
tempered its ability to fulfill its mission. As of March, 1944, the MG
staffs served under the general staffs on the army group, army, corps and
division level. Nevertheless, within this structure a network of MG
special staffs, or detachments, were intended to make up for the lack of
autonomy. In all counties? (Kreise and the rural Landkreise), cities,
provinces, bureaucratic territories and states (Lander) in enemy territory,
MG detachments, specially oriented in local conditions, moved in with
the advancing combat troops and attempted to establish rule over its
area. The immediate instigation of "indirect rule" --installing
"acceptable" Germans in administrative positions over which MG
mandated.-- was preferred, but in cases of complete breakdown of
·German administration the detachment would administer temporartly.8

6Hajo Holborn, American Military Government. Its Organization
and Policies (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947) 48.
7Kreis and Landkrels can also be translated as "administrative

districts."
8Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 159.
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In the early phase of the occupation, the main tasks of MG were to
·hinder the German civilian population from disrupting military

operations, but at the same time to secure the interim supervision of and
care for those civilians. MG was to simply "get things going again; .. g it
was to apply "apolitical" methods of, above all, a practical and effective
nature. The "shaping of the postwar world" would be left to later civilian
administrators and politicians.1 0 Consummating military objectives,
establishing an "order," and setting up MG itself was the emphasis.
Implementation of such methods has elicited the criticism that in this
crucial period of "democratization," the chances for "real" reform were
lost to a "milder," political and administrative continuity.11
MG's mission of guaranteeing "public safety" in the early and
chaotic months of the occupation -- the theme of subsequent chapters -was crucial to the success of the early occupation. Accordingly, in the
early phase MG was allowed influence over the traditional army only
within these critical domains of "law and order" and "military
security. "12 This corresponded to the MG's purpose of assuring a stable
environment for the US tactical troops, as well as for the occupied
population. Since US troops were entering areas of untold ruin and
9Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 161.
10Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 158-59.
11Boehling 382. See also: Leonard Krieger, "The Potential for
Democratization in Occupied Germany," Public Policy, ed. John D.
Montgomery and Albert 0. Hirschman, vol. 17, {Cambridge, Mass:
HaiVard University Press.1968) 28-58.
12Ntethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 158.
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disorder, maintaining public safety had to be one of the ''first and major"
aims of MG offlcers.13

On the local level, MG often found it difficult to attempt the
application of its aims. MG was at the mercy of tactical commanders
who had little appreciation of MG's mission. Furthermore, the tactical
commanders' tolerance for MG and its assignment differed greatly from
unit to unit. These factors contributed to great differences in the
administration and effectiveness of MG from area to area.14 The
"dualism" of tactical and MG commanders working side by side easily led
to confused circumstances. The troop commander was concerned with
military objectives, whereas the MG detachment officers hoped to
resurrect an efficient local administration. Orders from a troop
commander were often canceled by the MG detachment, or the opposite
happened. As a result the local German administrators were frequently
confused as to what their American occupiers wanted.15
The MG detachments soon became independent of the tactical
army. During the months following the capitulation, MG gradually broke
away from the regular army structure, came under the direction of
General Lucius D. Clay, 16 and assumed a greater role for itself. Spring
13Holborn 33.
14Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 159. Niethammer notes that as
the G-5 structure was grafted onto the tactical staff structure, troop
commanders were ordered to consider MG's tasks a major objective, yet
that order probably came too late to have much effect.
15Boehling 541 .
l6works on General Clay and the occupation include Clay's
account: Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY:
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and Summer 1945 were months of"feverish redeployment." The
enormous Allied administration of SHAEF was officially dissolved at the
end of June 1945.17 The capitulation in Europe made many combat
personnel available for duty in MG positions. The number of MG
personnel doubled by July. 18 By September the "regime" of a US wartime
occupation army had disintegrated and given way to a more autonomous
system and clear hierarchy of MG. In October 1945 the now independent
G-5, or Civil Affairs branch responsible for MG, was renamed OMGUS
(Office of MG for the US Zone of Germany), and the regional MG (RMG)
for Bavaria became OMGB (Office of MG for Bavaria).19
The MG detachments had an ambiguous role in the early period.
On the one hand, they had to maintain security for military goals and
the initial care of the civilian population, which demanded strong
measures, including the shutting out of any officials with links to the
Nazi party; on the other hand, they were to "dominate" affairs in their
area only when necessaty, and to appoint competent Germans able to get
things running again. This became problematic since many of the

Doubleday & Company, 1950. See also: The Papers of General Lucius D.
Clay: Germany 1945-1949, Ed. Jean Edward Smith, 2 vols.,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974); Jean Edward Smith,
Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1990. On Clay's successor in Germany, John J. McCloy, see: Thomas
Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal
Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991).
1 7Holbom 50.
18Holbom 47.
19Ntethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 155; 168-170.

18
available capable figures, having lived in a society as politicized as the
Third Reich, had some sort of a "link" with the Nazi party.
The preference for indirect rule, or guidance as opposed to
domination, hinted at the broader, later goals of the occupation: to not
"impose" democracy, but to only impose "restraints upon those elements
of the German population who would prevent democracy from being
established."20 "Democracy" would be built from the ground up, and
government decentralized, according to the Potsdam Agreement of August
2, 1945. The towns and Landkreise, for example, were the first
administrative units in which German self-government was established,
in the American zone as well as in the other four zones. Furthermore, US
combat commanders, in the early phase -- when tQ.ey were in charge of
the occupation -- thought it impractical, and too complicated, to
attempt to control Germany by undertaking direct operating
responsibilities. It was much simpler to oversee affairs administered by
Germans themselves.21
The early emphasis on an "apolitical" effectiveness was partly due
to confused and ill-defined Allied policy. In 1944 the G-5, or the Civil
Affairs section of SHAEF responsible for MG, began developing its own
plans for MG procedure. The resulting plans, comprised in the SHAEF
"Handbook for Militacy Government in Germany," were necessitated by a
distinct lack of policy direction from Washington. G-5's formulations
20carl J. Friedrich and Associates, American Experiences in
Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart & Company,
1948) 14, qtd. in Boehling, 335.
21 Boehling 335.
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were very cautious; G-5 planners still expected final directives from
Washington, but did not know how close Washington's policy would be
to their own formulations. Thus, while waiting on Washington, G-5's
own planners avoided political orientation and indoctrination.22
In the same period procedures were approved by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. CSS 551 ("Combined Directive For Military Government
in Germany Prior to Defeat Or Surrender") of April28, 1944,23 consisted
of .the most fundamental operational and political objectives and was to
be valid only until the capitulation. After the capitulation the more
comprehensive and politically oriented JCS 1067 ("Directive to
Commander-In-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding
Militruy Government of Germany") would be adopted.24 JCS 106725 was
issued in April1945 and enumerated many of the broader policy
statements later adopted by the Allied Powers in the Potsdam Agreement
of August 2, 1945.
Early in the occupation MG officers stuck to the directives of both
the SHAEF handbooks and CSS 551. JCS 1067 appeared only at the end
22Holborn 33.
23Holbom 33; full text of CSS 551 in Holborn 135-43.
24Niethammer, "B~satzungsmacht" 161.
25Full text in Holborn 157-72, Documents on Germany. 19441985, Office of the Historian, Department of State: Washington, D.C.,
1986, 15. For a brief piece on the evolution of JCS 1067, see Earl F.
Ziemke, "The Formulation and Implementation of U.S. Occupation Policy
in Germany," U.S. Occupation in Europe after World War II: Papers and
Reminisces from the April23-24. 1976. Conference Held at the George C.
Marshall Research Foundation. Lexington, Virginia (Lawrence: The
Regents Press of Kansas, 1978).
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of hostilities, a demanding and insecure period, and a time when MG
officers were already familiar with earlier, and less intricate, rules of
procedure. Furthermore, many MG officers found JCS 1067 impractical
in this early, chaotic period; it had little do with diverse and dire local
conditions. Many MG officers simply ignored JCS 1067 early on.26
Nevertheless, the phase of pragmatism was short-lived. The
demand for apolitical expediency gradually gave way during the summer
of 1945 to the greater political and economic designs put forth by the
Allied Powers, JCS 1067, as well as the heightened and better formulated
role of MG. The phase of "improVisation" lasted until roughly the
beginning of July. Corresponding to the disbanding ofSHAEFa thick,
detailed MG directive book (USFET [United States Forces European
Theater] "Administration of Militaty Government") came into effect. This
set of directives interpreted the final version of JCS 1067 for MG and
detailed implementation for the various specialized MG sections. At this
time the "combat phase" of the occupation officially ended. 2 7 A
prescribed and precisely delineated method of "denaziflcation"28 replaced
the early practice of simply shutting out or imprisoning Nazi party

26Niethammer, "Besatzungmacht" 161.
27Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayem: Sauberung und
Rehabilitation unter amerikanischer Besatzung (Frankfurt a. M.: S.
Fischer, 1972); 149.
28Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 138ff. The complex evolution of
denazification policy -- thoroughly explored by Niethammer and in
monographs mentioned above-- will not be treated here. On
denazification also see James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine:
Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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members according to the judgment of the local MG commander or a CIC
(Counter Intelligence Corps --army intelligence) officer. The
implementation of JCS 1067 and the substantially defined MG directives
became more certain after the Potsdam Agreement, and eventually
confirmed the increasingly crucial status of MG for "reshaping"
Germany.29
Over the course of the occupation, MG detachments would
increasingly yield responsibilities to German authorities. MG assumed
more of an advisory role. At the same time, MG, with its own
independent structure, better coordinated policy.

CHAOS AND EXPEDIENCY

The first MG detachments moving farther and farther into Bavaria
under the wing of the advancing US armies encountered conditions of
varied and usually bewildering complexity. As discussed, the German
infrastructure was in many cases fully destroyed, and local
administrations abandoned. The MG units themselves varied greatly in
character and competence.
MG personnel's status as members of combat units required them
to employ "elasticity" and "effectiveness," two of the most important
organizational principles of the advancing US combat troops. For the
smaller MG units above all, elasticity meant self-reliance and the ability
to arrive at decisions quickly and without advice from above.

29Niethammer, "Besatzungmacht" 170.
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Effectiveness was the "apolitical" emphasis on the immediate, pragmatic
achievement ofMG and milltacy goals.30
It can be argued that MG simply enjoyed neither the time nor

resources to execute anything but the most pressing tasks. Ambitious
and thorough political reform, or the strict reliance on "policy" could
hardly have been foremost on MG officers' minds. Demands on MG
included the following:31
.... Restoring lines of communication .... discovering German
resources useful to the Allied war effort, maintaining public safety,
taking measures against epidemics, etc. High priority had also to
be given to lending immediate assistance to United Nations
nationals, of whom more than six million were expected to be
encountered in the Western Zone of Germany. In addition,
property of the Allies or of the United Nations held or robbed by
the Nazis was to be taken into custody.
Furthermore, although MG personnel increased, the amount of
personnel available to complete such oveiWhelming jobs was still
relatively small. Before VE-Day, only 7,500 officers and enlisted men
comprised MG in all of Germany. 32
The establishment of MG in many areas was marked by confusion,
varied inventiveness, and sometimes scandal. MG teams and
detachments had been "pin-pointed" for specific areas and districts. Yet
the individual units often found themselves in regions unknown from
preparations, and the units' ability to act with decisiveness was greatly
tested: "These were the days in which any central direction of [MG]
30Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 161.
31Holbom 33.
32Holborn 34.
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operations could hardly be attempted and the officer in the field had to
find his own solutions ... 33
The complete breakdown of the German infrastructure,
communications, and government increased the helplessness and
isolation of the local German community. In this situation many a MG
commander became the "lord" of his area, a situation that allowed him
much leeway for reaching effective solutions.34 The chaos sometimes led
to interestingly dubious situations. Such circumstances were much more
pronounced in the rural areas and smaller towns than in the large cities,
where the detachments had better information and more contact with
higher-ups and central posts.
Many MG commanders took ove·r their area with pronounced zeal
and pride, hurried to set up the minimal administration and
infrastructure necessacy, and attempted to build up their Kreise into a
functional unit capable of sustaining itself. This sometimes occurred at
the expense of a nearby "rival" Kreis and a competing MG officer. This
brand of "enthusiasm" often resulted in the phenomenon of the
Kreiskonige (the "kings of the Kreis"): MG commanders who consolidated

their area without consideration for greater needs or common policy.
Eager MG officers sometimes hurriedly named to chief positions
Germans they truste,d or were advised to rely on. Consistent throughout
the US-controlled areas was a naive dependance on recommendations of

33Holborn 34.
34 Niethammer, En tnazifizierung 138-139.
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Catholic Church authorities.35 In many cases figures given
responsibilies turned out to be controversial or unacceptable in respect
to military security and political reliability. Many "criminal types," or
simple charlatans found their way into high posts by, for example,
simply claiming an anti-Nazi stance, a needed skill, or playing upon the
innocent outlook of some MG commanders. The professional competence
of local German candidates was a distinct advantage, as was English
language ability.36 Other characters were installed and supported fully,
only to be identified as "big Nazis" and lose their positions days later. In
the confusion, some opportunists were reported to Cic,37 some were not.
Ultimately, it was the mission of tactical troops to consummate
the defeat of Germany in accord with military objectives, and the
responsibility of MG to rebuild local German structures in agreement
with increasingly political aims. In the first months of the occupation
however, chaotic conditions demanded that these two distinct goals
would be combined to a certain extent, even when tactical commanders

35Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 161-166; Niethammer,
Entnazifizierung 138-143.
36Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 141. English was the "official"
language during the occupation: all written material pertaining to
matters overseen by MG had to be in English (Chronik der Stadt
Miinchen, ed. Wolffram Selig, [Miinchen: Stadtarchiv, 1980] 59).
37Niethammer ("Besatzungsmacht" 162) notes that various
military intelligence groups existed in this period. They were being redeployed and or absorbed into other agencies, but the status of many
intelligence personnel was unclear. Many agents simply stayed on in a
territory and served at their own initiative until their future was
clarified. Such figures contributed to an intelligence rivalry that led to
uncoordinated and irregular data.
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lost influence. Furthermore, early occupation policy was incongruous
and left many local MG detachments to reach their own conclusions as
to the manner in which milita:ry government should establish itself.
In this environment, dilemmas and errors were unavoidable.
Nevertheless, whatever the policy or predicament, in the first months of
the occupation, the establishment of an "order" was a crucial, imperative
job for MG to perform. The occupation agenda could not progress
without the assurance of relative stability. Under these circumstances,
the assurance of public safety-- of law and order -- became a
fundamental element of MG control.

CHAPTER III

LOCAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Advancing into Southern Bavaria in mid-April 1945, US forces of
the Seventh and Third Army encountered a few final moments of serious
fighting. A bloody four-day battle for Nuremberg destroyed what was left
of an already crippled city.l Nevertheless, the pace at which US forces
covered ground hinted that the war would soon be over. On April 23, the
Seventh Army's lOth Armored Division took twenty-eight towns in a
single day. "Pinpoint" MG detachments, those specifically trained to
govern a particular area, were in many cases moving in on the same day
as the combat troops.2 Developments were moving fast, despite what
turned out to be needless caution exercised by US forces entering the
notorious "last redoubt," or Alpenfestung --the rugged Alpine areas south
of Munich believed to be prepared by Nazi diehards for a vicious last
stand.3 As it turned out, US combat troops were not put to any great
test in Southern Bavaria.

lziemke, Army247.
2ziemke, Army 249.
3Both Allied leaders and Nazi leaders were duped by widespread
belief in the invincibility of the Alpenfestung. Allied planners chose to
follow their fears instead of intelligence facts, while Nazi leaders ignored
the facts and embraced the rumours of the final stand in the Bavarian
Alps. The myth of the "last redoubt" is chronicled in: Rodney G. Minott,
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For local MG detachments, however, many great challenges were
just beginning. MG detachments began the arduous task of establishing
themselves in a given area and setting up local authority. Events in the
Bavarian capital of Munich described below -- and in subsequent
chapters -- illustrate issues indicative of the early occupation, but also
contrasts to the norm. A brief account of the situation in Landkreis
Miesbach serves to further reveal disparities in readiness among MG
detachments. Lastly, depiction of the fleeting, problematic Freiheits-Aktion
Bayem resistance movement reveals an unexpected challenge to US

occupiers.

MIESBACH.: MILITARY GOVERNMENT AUF DEM LANDE

Various standards of MG implementation can be seen in the
situation in rural areas and smaller towns. There are many similar
examples from the reports of rural Kreis-detachments.4 The following MG
accounts from Kreis Miesbach clearly depict the irregular implementation
of MG. In comparison with the Munich situation detailed in the rest of
this work, this brief summacy of Miesbach MG reveals how completely
different a detachment could perform in an area just a few miles from
Munich.

The Fortress That Never Was (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1964).

4BayHStA, OMGUS Annual, Monthly, and Weekly Detachment
Reports.
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The rural Landkreis capital of Miesbach was itself quite different
from the Munich metropolis, and gathered far less attention. The
Miesbach MG detachment was clearly not nearly as prepared or suitably
staffed for its mission as the highly capable and informed Munich MG
detachment. MG reports for Miesbach also serve to demonstrate how MG
authorities judged their own performance.
Some of the developments described exceed the period this study
emphasizes but are worthy of brief mention, as Miesbach, like many
"insignificant" areas, lived With controversy well after the beginning
months of the occupation.
Miesbach is not well known and deserves an introduction.
Miesbach is a typical Landkreis just south of Munich, and lies in the
passes between the Alpine foothills and the Bavarian Alps. As it is today,
the town of Miesbach was in 1945 Kreisstadt, or capital of the county
(thus sharing the same name as the Landkreis), as well as the chief
market town in the Kreis. It retained all the main government offices and
courts. The Landkreis was and is today a popular German resort area. In
1945 the Landkreis was overwhelmingly Catholic: 54,356 inhabitants
were Catholic, 8,549 Protestant, and 1 ,872 of other religions. The town of
Miesbach was best represented by employees of industry and handicrafts,
the Landkreis by farmers. Trade and handicraft were an old tradition
there, as Miesbach allegedly once profitted fro~ a Roman Road.5

5BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/51-3/2, "Description of a Landkreis" 4-9.
A note on MG documents: "BayHStA" denotes the Bayerisches
Hauptsaatsarchiv and "OMGB" Organized Milita:ry Government of
Bavaria. "(Y)" is an internal designation of the Bayerisches
Hauptstaatsarchiv; the numbers stand for number, box, and folder and
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Landkreis Miesbach was known during the war as the "Nazi air-raid

shelter." Many party members, military men, and industrialists moved
their families there during the war and remained thereafter. 6
The war inflicted little devastation to the Kreisstadt Miesbach but
much to the Landkreis in general. 7 As was the case in many rural
Bavarian Landkreisen, a major problem in Miesbach was the arrival of
refugees.18.5% of the 66,547 inhabitants of the Landkreis in 1945 were
refugees who had never resided in Bavaria before the war. Many more
were flooding in from the Munich area. Furthermore, 3,228 POWs native
to the area had not yet returned. These numbers reveal that Miesbach
was representative of large parts of rural Bavaria which did not suffer
great damage to housing;8 in the case of Miesbach the increases in
refugees absorbed housing formerly devoted to the tourist trade, and
Army requisitioning absorbed other spaces. 9
A MG team sent in 1947 to investigate occupation conditions in
Landkreis Miesbach found the situation unfortunate but typical.

Investigations held there, "if probed to equal depth would reveal similar
conditions elsewhere." 10

are set apart accordingly. Where page numbers are not given there were
none in the reports.
6BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation ofLandkreis
Miesbach."
7BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/51-3/2, "Description" 5.
8BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/51-3/2, "Description" 8.
9BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation."
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What did the occupation authorities fmd improper in Miesbach? In
areas such as Miesbach the phase between the end of combat operations
and the establishment of MG was often thoroughly confused. Around the
time of the German capitulation the MG detachment intended for
Miesbach was held up in another nearby Kreis, Bad Aibling. It was forced
to serve there for a brief time because tactical forces would not give up
the Miesbach area to the specially trained MG detachments.11
The original detachment did assume responsibility for Miesbach,
but only on May 16, 1945, over a week after the capitulation.12 Who was
in charge at that time is unclear. Operations in this first week were very
chaotic, dangerous, and somewhat scandalous, according to this telling
report on Miesbach from the week of May 13-20:13
Public alarmed over Army police permitting SS officers and a
limited number of enlisted men to remain armed with some
freedom. Three civilians shot (one a CIC informant, fatally) by such
elements. Troops under command of German General von Hahn,
10sayHStA OMGB(Y) 10192-1125, "Investigation." The file of a CIC
investigating team in Miesbach dated December 1945 (BayHStA
OMGB(Y) 10192-1 I 5) was labelled "restricted" and thus unavailable to
this writer. Nevertheless, the later investigating team quoted here
concurred (10192-1 125, "Investigation") with the restricted findings of
the CIC team.
11BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach detachment "Annual
Historical Report" 1945 I 46 (hereafter: Miesbach AHR) 1. The reasons for
this are unclear. Ne't"ertheless, the decision was presumably a strictly
operational one -- as of May 1 the US Seventh Army's advance had not
fully incorporated the Miesbach area (Dieter Wagner, Miinchen '45
zwischen Ende und Anfang, [Munich: Siiddeutscher Verlag, 1970] 36).
12BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach AHR 1.
13BayHStA OMGB(Y) 131142-117, Weekly MG for Munich Report
(hereafter MG Weekly), May 13-20, 1945.

31
who has complete freedom of movement. It is asserted he
repeatedly stated in addressing his men that the war is not lost
and another German Army will be formed.
The Miesbach detachment was initially commanded by Major Louis
L. Haupt14 and consisted of six officers and eleven enlisted men. This
original detachment was trained in Shrivenham, England, and prepared
further in Civil Mfairs branch centers in France and Belgium.15 The
detachment did not last long in its original state. It went through
countless changes of personnel; 16 a reflection of the massive
redeployment and demobilization after VE-Day.
There was clear friction between the two noted "styles" of MG
officer. A compelling passage written by a Miesbach MG officer reveals
how one officer viewed the effects of the "duality" of MG personnel. If his
judgement is accurate, the constant changes surely affected the ability of
the unit to perform: 1 7
Many officers and enlisted men have worked for this Detachment
with vacying proficiency. It is interesting to observe that many of
the officers and Enlisted Men coming to the Detachment fresh
from tactical [combat] units have done more efficient and more
honest work than those trained for months in ECAD [European
Civil Affairs Division] schools. The series of pools in which many

14BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10177-311, MiesbachAHR 1. Useful
information on all but the major MG officers is unfortunately
unavailable to this researcher.
15BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 77-3 I 1, Miesbach AHR 1. The author of
the report notes ( 1) that no member of this detachment personnel "had
any actual experience in Military Government."
16BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach AHR 1.
17BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach AHR 3. The name or
background of the au thor is not accessible.
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specialized Militaty Government Officers were forced to stagnate
over a year was as vicious a system as can be conceived: there is
hardly a man who has passed through it who has not given
concrete evidence of demoralization in the most exact sense of the
word. The long sterile inactivity, the theoretical half fish, half fowl
militacy training, killed all enthusiasm and interest in the officers
and men, and many became subject to a complete moral
breakdown. In the field, where the best results can be obtained by
a strict application of directives issued by higher headquarters,
officers and men trained as tactical troops to obey and implement
orders often accomplished the objectives of Military Government
more completely than by officers trained out of mind on undigested
material who have decided that they know better than the
directives . . . .
The author of this passage most likely came to MG from the ranks of the
tactical army.
Common in the Landkreisen was a lack of what MG considered
acceptable, competent Germans to head posts.18 A look at the
succession of men holding the title of Miesbach Landrat, the head of the ·
Landkreis administration, reveals the problems MG faced in finding

suitable administrators and identifying suspect ones. Shortly before US
troops arrived in the area, Frick, the last Third Reich Landrat (and son of
the Minister of the Interior who preceeded Himmler), committed suicide.
His deputy took over but was promptly removed by the detachment. A
pre-1933 Landrat, von Wehner, remained in office until August 1, 1945,
but "his competence and pleasant nature alone" could not hold him in
office, since "his past was too damning:" He had been a senior civil
18This work does not consider in great detail the political aspects
of MG's reluctance to empower the sudden glut of "anti-Nazis," or the
controversial Denazification process. Nevertheless, both themes will be
referred to in the following sections on the Freiheits-Aktion-Bayern and
the reestablishment of German police. On the subject of German
administrative continuity and the possibility of reform, see Boehling 333383.
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servant from 1927 to 1944, a Wehrmacht major and served as Military
Governor in Belgium during the war. He was succeeded by Leopold
Schindler, who had no compromising associations with the Nazi party.
At first he seemed excellent but then it became clear that he was both
"paranoiac and a psychopathic mythomaniac." He was finally removed in
May 1946, "to the relief of the public." A KPD (Kommunistische Partei
Deutschlands) member, Reith, held the position until Baron von Schoen,

former German Ambassador to Chile, was elected by the Kreis tag .19 This
election was disapproved by MG, and Reith assumed the position again,
but temporartly.20
The detachment "had the same problems [as) in many towns and
Kreise[; ].... many MG officers were flattered by competent officials who

nevertheless had a NAZI past and were reluctant to let them go. "21 The
194 7 investigation of Miesbach conditions found that:22
. . . . Military Government in Miesbach lacked judgement,
intelligence and impartiality-- from the beginning. This is equally
apparent to the present team. The records reveal superficial
investigations and approvals of [local German) MG employees and
of local German government officials, and careless enforcement of
MG policies.
After preparing over 150 files on individuals assigned positions by MG,
receiving over 200 intercepts and conducting numerous interviews, the

19The first local elections were allowed on May 26, 1946 (Chronik
168).
20BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1, Miesbach AHR 5-8.
21BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1, Miesbach AHR 8.
22BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation."

34

investigators were "favorably impressed" with only four individuals. The
MG commander was ultimately responsible: the team disclosed that the
"negligence, malfeasance and unfitness" of German officials approved by
MG "should not have escaped attention by the series of M.G.O.'s ([sic]
Military Government Officers-- in this case the commanding MG officer)
at Miesbach."23
In Miesbach the practice of indirect rule was fraught with
difficulty. The patterns the team criticized were set in motion from the
beginning of the occupation, a time when any communication with
Germans -- apart from giving commands -- was forbidden. A nonfraternization policy was in effect under the simple justification that "all
Germans are Nazis."24 However, in Landkreisen such as Miesbach, the
"cooperation" between occupier and occupied appeared too amiable for
visiting MG authorities, and for detachment insiders as well. The author
of the Miesbach detachment's "Annual Historical Report" felt it
necessacy to add this summacy of the situation:25
It has been proved over and and over again that the officer who is
lulled into confidence by a surface obsequiousness is forgetting an
essential fact: no people loves or trusts or essentially wishes to
help the power. that occupies it.

23BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation."
24Boehling 341-343. Boehling (342) points out that: "The nonfraternization directive did not help the incoming MG detachments in
making their decisions about which Germans to appoint to
administrative posts, nor did it encourage anti-Nazis who might have
been in teres ted in working with the Allies constructively toward restoring
democracy."
25BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1, Miesbach AHR.
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The investigators from CIC concluded by recommending numerous
dismissals of Germans in positions high and low. Regarding the
detachment itself, the team did not want to "minimize the poor
inheritance bequeathed to the present MGO by earlier Military
Government officers." Nevertheless, the team found the MGO "little
better endowed with the qualities of impartiality and judgement than his
[many] predecessors," and recommended his immediate replacement.26
It is evident that the Landkretsen dilemmas characteristic of the
first days were not resolved quickly. Of course, as touched upon earlier,
the need for military security and stabilization of chaotic conditions
made the application of political reform and purging in the first days
only secondary in importance. In Miesbach political cleansing did not
seem to become as important as it was supposed to be later. Naturally,
the Miesbach example is not indicative of MG in general, nor is it a
judgment of MG in general. It does, however, demonstrate the difficulties
MG faced when dealing With local conditions and performing its tasks
under constant changes of command and in isolated areas.

MUNICH: THE FIRST DAYS

Munich, of course, was definitely not Miesbach. The Bavarian
capital held much significance -- not only because of the city's status as
the Hauptstadt der Bewegung ("Capital of the [National Socialist]
Movement") in the Third Reich, but also as a prominent Groj3stadt. The

26BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation."
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appointments and responses of Munich MG had greater significance than
anywhere else in Bavaria. Munich MG most directly expressed the
intentions of the RMG for Bavaria. Without German administration on
the Land (state) level, many of the responsibilities and measures MG in
Munich held or oversaw sufficed initially as Land-Wide ones.27
Munich MG was well-prepared for its important role. The unit was
better trained, informed and staffed than the typical MG unit. The
Munich detachment was formed in England in 1944. Mter scrutinizing
relatively detailed information on Munich area conditions and known
figures, the unit formulated a plan of feasible operations. Since Munich
had better, more specifically trained detachment personnel than the
other US Zone cities, as well as more pertinent background information,
it was easier in Munich to put theocy into practice. Part of the reason for
this lay in the fact that US forces took Munich so late-- there was more
time to learn about conditions from Germans recently living there, and
the detachment was able to learn from other detachments' problems.28
In any case Munich's status as the birthplace of the Nazi movement
demanded special MG attention.29
The city was taken almost Without any resistance. In the early
hours of April 30, around 2:00a.m., a forward US unit, supported by

27wagner 158; Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 177.
28For description of how the situation in the first city occupied by
US troops, Aachen, influenced later MG practice, see Niethammer,
"Besatzungsmacht" 172- 177.
29Boehling 358-359: " .... the retired [Munich MG commander]
Keller wrote in 1959 that 'we knew Munich better than we did our own
homes."'
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armor, was able to reach the Prinzregentenplatz east of central Munich.
They came under only sparse, uncoordinated fire from civilians which the
troops quickly located and disarmed. The unit's goal was to set up a
command post at a specific, indeed symbolic spot nearby: Hitler's private
Munich residence in the Regentenstrq[je. They took this without
resistance. 30 The main advancing troops experienced few skirmishes. The
Third, Forty-Second, and Forty-Fifth divisions of the US Seventh Army
reaching the outskirts of the city encountered only small, sporadic
groups ofWaffen-SS soldiers. Pasing, a significant suburb west of the
central city, was occupied by 8:15 a.m .. 31
The official surrender of the city was an initially confused but
basically routine undertaking. Between 1:45 and 2:00p.m. on April30, a
US reconnaissance unit riding in a jeep found the streets uncannily
quiet, and continued until reaching the Marienplatz in front of Munich's
Rathaus (city hall). A huge crowd of just released POWs and Miinchner32

cheered them, but after a few minutes the unit pressed on. An hour or so
later another probing US jeep, this one from the Information Control
Division (lCD), stopped to observe the curious, spirited crowd on the

30wagner 126-127: the unit immediately took an inventocy of the
Fuhrer's flat. Apart from a bust of Geli Raubal -- Hitler's niece and once
alleged lover -- twelve autographed editions of Mein Kampf were the most
notable fmds.
31wagner 128.
32Niethammer ("Besatzungsmacht". 1 '(6) notes that large sections
of the population greeted the Americans' arrival as the "final blow"
liberating them from tyranny and war ("Der Einzug der Amerikaner wurde
in breiten Schichten der Bevolkerung als bejreiender Schluflstrich unter
Gewaltherrschajt und Krieg empjunden").
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Marienplatz. The occupants of this second jeep also left shortly thereafter

to resume their inspection. Remarkably, the Munich official ordered to
stay in the Rathaus and handle the surrender, Dr Michael Meister,33
claimed to have missed both episodes from his location inside the
Rathaus. The "official" Munich capitulation was fmally arranged later in.

the day, and took place in a private Munich residence between an
unidentified US General and Meister.34
Early in the morning of May 1, the Munich MG detachment arrived
at the Munich Rathaus to begin operations. The detachment was headed
by Lt. Col. Walter H. Kurtz and his assistant Lt. Col. Eugene Keller, Jr.
Concerning the Munich MG commander Kurtz, visiting MG observers
noted the following: 35

33aecause of his English ability, Meister, Director of the
Rechtsabteilung im Emiihrungs- und Wirtschc:iftsamt, was ordered by a
representative of the Nazi-Oberbiirgermeister Fiehler to remain in the
Rathaus so he could officially surrender the city (Wagner 134 ).

34 Hans-Gunter Richardi, "Bejubelt -- doch von der Geschichte
iibersehen," Siiddeutsche Zeitung [Munich], 8 Oct. 1993: 47. This recent
article refutes the long-held assumption that the leader of the second US
unit to pass over the Marienplatz, Ernest Langendorf, a German native
serving as an lCD officer, was actually the first US "liberator."
Furthermore, the article reveals that the commonly documented
surrender of the Munich Rathaus (in Boehling 358; Chronik 42) is false.
The insufficient official history of Munich MG (US Army Historical
Division, Headquarters European Command, Military Government in
Munich 1945-1947, vol. 1, Special Studies Series 3, [N.p.:1951] 1) states
only that "(Munich] surrendered on the evening of 30 April to Lieutenant
General Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps.
35aayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/451 /2, Operations Report of Munich
MG (hereafter: Op. Report), July 8, 1945, 28. Unfortunately little is
known about Kurtz. His name is not usually mentioned in renditions of
the Munich occupation. Niethammer ("Besatzungsmacht" 1 77), for
example, simply lists Keller as the "MG commander" (MG-Chef). Kurtz
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Lt. Col Kurtz, in command, is an able and cool headed officer, a
good organizer and administrator, and with a clearer definition
and a more general understanding of his authority by the local
commanders and the German civil authorities .... [Kurtz] can be
counted on to turn in an excellent performance.
Kurtz's time in Munich was short, however: on September 27, 1945 he
died as a result of an unusual accident. He was struck by a falling stone
from the Rathaus.36 Thereupon Keller became Munich MG
commander.37 Keller, an engineer by training, spoke German because of
Alsatian ancestry and personally made many of the most important early
Munich contacts and gave out most instructions.38
Successful control of the largest city in the US Zone of Occupation
demanded a special detachment. In Munich the internal problems
between tactical and MG detachments do not appear to have posed as
many problems as elsewhere. MG detachment officers reportedly had
their specialized sections "well in hand," were "competent" and
"experienced" officers who were given positions for which "they seemingly

played an effective, yet "behind-the-scenes role," and left most
"observable" tasks for assistant Keller to handle personally-- presumably
due to Keller's language abilities -- giving the impression that Keller was
the highest-ranking MG officer from the beginning (Boehling 360-61).
36sayHStA OMGB(Y) CO I 445 I 1 1, Operations Report on Military
Government Detachment No. F-213, SK Munich (hereafter: Op. Report),
Dec. 19, 1945, 2; Chronik 67.
37BayHStA OMGB(Y) COI4451 I 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2.
Maj. David R. Blossom became Keller's assistant. By then Keller and
Blossom were the only original officers serving with the detachment; they
were assigned to Munich MG on Sept. 18, 1944 (2).
38soehling 360-61.
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are best qualified." They were "ve:ry serious in their sense of responsibility
and the necessity for finishing the job and not running out on it."39
Nevertheless, MG reports do reveal some common dilemmas brought on
by the many personnel changes and scarcities resulting from
redeployment and MG reorganization.40
Some of the greatest challenges to Munich MG lay in restoring the
necessary city infrastructure -- communications, fire services, utilities,
etc. -- crippled from years of bombing: 74 Allied bombing raids had struck
Munich between 1940 and 1945, dropping 3,519,450 bombs ofvartous
kinds. 6,632 persons were killed, 15,800 wounded. 300,000 residents were
homeless, 81,500 dwellings destroyed. Ninety percent of the historic
Altstadt was flattened. 41 Despite Munich's lack of industrial targets, the

city's reputation as the well of Nazism made it a required target for Allied
bombers.42 Untold amounts of rubble covered the city. Confronted with
the chaos, the Munich MG's well qualified sections began to apply their
specialized training with critical expediency, according to MG reports:43
The first days of the occupation were extremely trying ones With
everyone in Military Government striving to get his "feet on the
ground" and create some measure of order out of the chaos and
confusion which existed. Despite the chaotic conditions, [the

39BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ I 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2.
40BayHStA OMGB[Y] 10/78-1/4, Munich detachment Annual
Historical Report 1945/46 [hereafter: Munich AHR]), 3.
41chronik 42-43.
42ziemke, Army 253.
43BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 2.
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Munich MG detachment] began to function immediately .... a
mess was quickly established, the operation of the message center
commenced, .... the necessru:y proclamations were posted,
control of the fire dept. (achieved} .... by the 8th of May the
hydro-electric system was again functioning, public works and
utilities was [sic] established, banks were closed, a displaced
persons office was opened and on the 17th of May street car lines
were again in partial operation ....
In appointing Germans-- and practicing indirect rule-- Munich
MG officers demonstrated a further pragmatism. MG, as elsewhere, had
in this period the power to cause a permanent breach in the continuity
of German institutions and "thereby to alter the fundamental conditions
of German social and political life ... 44 The detachment, however, relied
on "acceptable," competent, largely pre-1933 "established" figures. The
Catholic church played a notable role in influencing early MG personnel
decisions. Kurtz and Keller were both identified as "fanatically Catholic,"
and on Kurtz's initiative Keller immediately contacted the prominent
Cardinal Michael Faulhaber for advice.45
Better preparations and information allowed Munich MG to
practice more stringent methods of Nazi "cleansing" than in many areas.
Yet MG avoided the chance to implement profound changes. In this
period Munich MG operated according to a prevalent two-step plan: MG
only shut out the worst Nazis, to bide its time in finding suitable
replacements. In this manner the true purging-- according to formulated
goals of later "denazification" --was postponed46 so that the practical,
44Krteger 56.
45soehling 359.
46Niethammer, "Entnaziflzierung 142.
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pressing tasks of MG could be accomplished. Indeed, a rough
"moratorium" existed more or less in most areas until July 1945: until
full establishment of MG, reestablishment of local administration, and
the implementation of the ban on political parties.47 By late summer the
demands of the elaborate denazification apparatus began to take
precedence over other matters.
A brief look at a couple of the first German officials appointed
reveals the "cautious" orientation. Upon arrival the first choice for
Munich Oberbiirgermeister (henceforth OB) was not to be found. Keller
thus appointed48 the first seemingly competent official he met in the
Rathaus to temporarily assume the post of OB:49 Dr Franz Xavier

Stadelmayer, a pre-1933 OB of nearby Wiirzburg, a member of the
Bavarian People's Party (BVP), parallel in Bavaria to the Catholic Center
party (Z). Stadelmayer had also become a member of the NSDAP,
although not until 1944. Stadelmayer readily informed Keller of this;
Keller made it clear he would only serve until a more suitable choice
could be found.50

47Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 142. The direct responsibility for
denazification would eventually be handed over to the Germans-- to the
relief of overworked MG officers; special denazification courts
(Spruchkammer) were set up to handle the multitude of cases.
48chronik 43.
49wagner 156.
50Boehling 359. Keller was impressed with Stadelmayer's
administrative capabilities and knowledge of Munich conditions, and
kept him on as Deputy Oberbiirgermeister, or 2. Biirgermeister (Boehling
359).
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This first choice for OB, Karl Scharnagl, was found soon thereafter
and appointed OB on May 4.51 Scharnagl was a former Munich OB and
BVP member. Schamagl, a baker by trade, had done time in Dachau, and
because he feared last-minute retaliations spent the last weeks of the
war in hiding. Scharnagl at first hesitated at Keller's request but Keller
told him he would be well-assisted and supported by MG; in any case he
could also force Scharnagl to take the post. 52
Many ministers appointed by MG or Schamagl (with MG's
blessing) were connected to the BVP and the Catholic Church. Unofficial
MG advisor Cardinal Faulhaber definitely favored such appointments.
Since a young age OB Scharnagl, for example, had been vecy active in
Catholic groups. Furthermore, Scharnagl's brother was a bishop under
the cardinal's jurisdiction. 53
Many of the officials reinstated were of conservative, pre-1933
orientation. Not all were affiliated with the Nazi party, but many were,
and soon found themselves dismissed because of MG adherence to
denazification directives. In Munich, careful denazification was practiced
from the start. Each city employee reporting for duty was required to fill
out a Fragebogen, the MG questionnaire on an individual's past and
involvement with the Nazi party or related organizations. The
questionnaires were screened by MG's Special Branch, which was

51chronik 43.
52soehling 360; Wagner 157-158.
53Boehling 361.
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responsible for denazification. The head of Munich Special Branch,
Captain Kurt Baer, was a German Jewish emigre who, unlike many
specialized MG officers, was first concerned with denazification, and
second with appointing efficient personnel. 54 The number ofFragebogen
became so great, however, that many were personnel were allowed to
work temporarily until processing of the questionnaires was finished. 55
This caused a minor gap in dismissals. Of the original 15 acting
department heads appointed by OB Scharnagl, nine had to be removed by
MG before the end of May. 56
Despite the tendency to search out pre-1933 officials, there was
more reinstatement of concentration camp victims and political
persecutees in Munich than in other large US Zone cities: "Overall ....
Munich seemed to have had a more progressive and representative
municipal administration in 1945-46 than either Frankfurt or
Stuttgart."57 In the first months Munich MG appeared to establish a
natural balance between specific, pragmatic concerns and broader goals
of denazification and political reform.

54soehling 360.
55Boehling 376.
56Boehling 375.
57Boehling 377-378.
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THE FLEETING ROLE OF THE FREIHEITS-AKTION BAYERN

In the days before and after the capitulation the Freiheits-Aktion
Bayem (literally: "Freedom Operation Bavaria") was able to create much

confusion among remaining German defenders, aid the efforts of tactical
troops, assist the CIC and facilitate the establishment of MG.
Nevertheless, such groups claiming to be "Anti-Nazi" presented MG with
a challenge. According to directives CSS 551 and JCS 1067, the "worst"
Nazis -- high party members, SS men -- were to be expelled and in many
cases imprisoned. How were groups of an "opposite" stance -- which MG
did not expect -- to be controlled? The example below illustrates the
limits in allowing Germans a role.
The efforts of the Freiheits-Aktion Bayem (FAB) helped assure that
US troops could take Munich without much resistance. 58 In the night of
April27-28, 1945, an assorted group of civilian and militacy men
attempted a goal they had coveted since Hitler came to power, with plans
they had formulated for over a year: revolt throughout Southern Bavaria.
Before the uprising began the FAB managed to channel a US and a
French prisoner of war through Allied lines to inform Allied commanders
of the impending rebellion, and to appeal for a stop to air
bombardments. Further heavy bombings were canceled for this reason. 59
The core of the FAB came from a Wehrmacht interpreter unit,
Dolmetscherkompanie VII. Captain Dr GerngroB, Major Caracciola and

58Bayerische Landeszeitung. Nachrichtenblatt der Allierten 12.
Heeresgruppe fur die deutsche Zivilbevolkerung June 1, 1945, 1.
59Boehling 357.
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Major Braun from this unit led the FAB revou.60 In a statement of vague
goals61 the FAB hoped for a union of all Nazi opposition. Indeed, for the
revolt itself the FAB cooperated with the socialist group "07"62 as well as
the monarchist group "Bayerische Freiheitsbewegung." The FAB and
fellow groups rose up with varied success and failure around Munich and
in most Landkreisen in Southern Bavarta.63 The FAB was reported very
active in Miesbach, for example.64
The FAB was able to create an amount of chaos among remaining
German forces, and for about twelve hours assumed official powers. In
the early morning hours, with support from a batallion belonging to the
17th Panzerdivision, the F AB captured the main broadcasting stations in
Erding and Freimann on the outskirts of Munich. From there they
broadcasted the signal for the revolt to begin, 65 and members of the
interpreter unit called upon foreign forced labor to "rise against the
Nazis." Factory workers blocked some access roads to Munich from which
SS reinforcements were expected. Railroad men brought trains to a halt.

60chronik 41-42.
61The FAB agenda in: Franz Obermaier, JosefMauerer, Aus
Triimmern wachst das Neue Leben (Munich: Neue Miinchner VerlagsGmbh, 1949) 9ff.
62Boehling 357.
63Niethammer, En tnazifizierung 126-12 7.
64BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, May 13-20, 1945.
65: The signal was Fasanenjagd, or "pheasant hunt" -- wartime
slang for the high-ranking Nazis was "pheasants."
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FAB managed to capture and for a short time occupy some key party and
municipal offices, including the Rathaus and the building housing the

Nazi paper Volkischer Beobachter. 66
FAB members searched out important local Nazis. In the Rathaus
they took prisoner the powerful Parteigenosse, Ratsherr and
Kreistagsprasident67 Christian Weber. Nevertheless, many targeted

figures were not located. Significantly, Gauleiter Giesler was not present
in his headquarters. He had fled Munich68 after entreating public
officials to stay at their posts and threatening them with harsh
punishment if they did not. Moreover, the leaders of the FAB failed to
convince the leading Munich -area Nazi Reichstatthalter Ritter von Epp to
begin immediate surrender negotiations with the Allies. 69

66Bay. Landeszeitung June 1, 1945, 1.
67parteigenosse =Party Member; Ratsherr =Councilman;
Kreistagsprdsident =District Assembly President.

68Boehling 357.
69chronik 42. "Reichstatthalter" was a powerful position in the
NSDAP of ambiguous and almost untranslatable meaning, commonly
reserved for "Alte Kampfer" (Old Fighters) such as von Epp.
Reichstatthalter, created in 1933, represented the central Reich
Government (Reichsregierung) within the lands of the Greater German
Reich (Deutsches Reich). The Reichstatthalter reported to the Reich Interior
Ministcy, had the duty of making sure that the Fuhrer's policies were
correctly followed~ and suggested proper candidates for the Fuhrer to
appoint to the Land Governments (NS-Deutsch. "Selbstverstandliche"
Begriffe und Schlagworter aus der Zeit der Nationalsozialismus, ed. KarlHeinz Brackmann and Renate Birkenmeier [Straelen: Straelener
Manuskripte Verlag, 1988, 159]). (An MG report translates
Reichstatthalter as "Land Director" (BayHStA OMGB(YJ 10/85-3/5,
Weekly Military Government Report for Land Bavaria (hereafter: MGB
Weekly}, May 21, 1945.), ironically the later, milder MG term for the
commanding US Land governor.
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Meanwhile, SS units were able to penetrate into the city. By the
late aftemoon of April28 bloody skirmishes had ensued between FAB
men and the SS troops. The FAB was not able to hold its positions. By
5:00 p.m. on April 28 it was announced the revolt had been suppressed.
Carriaccola was caught, immediately subjected to a court-martial, and
executed. Other FAB leaders, including Dr GemgroB, suiVived.70
The uprising revealed to MG that resistance did exist within
Germany, yet MG and tactical troops had been instructed to make no
distinction between common Germans and Nazis. The non-fraternization
directive discouraged possible "collaboration." Moreover, in this early
stage the only clear guidelines MG detachments had on appointing
personnel were negative ones: no "Nazis, Nazi sympathizers and
militarists" were to be given administrative positions. 71
Initially, impressed MG and tactical officers allowed the FAB a
significant role. In many outlying areas immediately before or after US
troops entered, FAB or related activists installed themselves in top
administrative posts, and the first US troops to arrive did not object. 72
In Munich, General Harris of the CIC arrived and approached FAB
leaders to offer them the chance to cooperate. Harris, who represented
only the CIC, explained that general Munich MG goals were not his
concern and used FAB men in finding and holding "dangerous" Nazis.

70chronik 41-42; Bay. Landeszeitung June 1, 1945, 1.
71 Boehling 341.
72wagner 144.
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FAB men were given an office and were required to issue reports to the
CIC, a task the FAB fulfilled zealously. 73
In a very short time the FAB seemed to become pivotal. It was
suddenly attractive, and within days the FAB ranks grew rapidly. The
office became overwhelmed with the task of registering and employing
new members, and was a meeting place for deliberations among members
of varied political orientation. The FAB post became an .. unofficial
Rathaus;" MG and CIC initially allowed political discussion within the
FAB ranks, although political organization of any kind was officially
strictly forbidden.74 Munich MG approached the FAB for advice on
suitable personalities for administrative posts.75
Nevertheless, the FAB's purpose was dubious, its function shortlived. It became clear that too many questionable characters and
opportunists were flooding into the FAB offices. Munich FAB leaders had
hoped to coordinate plans with groups which were quickly gathering
strength and responsibilities in the rest of Southern Bavaria. Munich
FAB leaders wanted to avoid any confusion of interests. The breakdown
of communications, however, gave the Munich office little if no control
over FAB activities outside ofMunich.76 MG, abiding by its own

73wagner 155: Concerns over Nazi-guerrillas, above all the
.. werewolves," influenced many early decisions involving military security.
74Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 129. According to the directives
CSS 551 (Holborn 138) and JCS 1067 (Holborn 162 ), political
association or activity was forbidden, unless MG "deemed otherwise."
75wagner 156; 164-165.
76wagner 165.
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directives, did not allow telephone or messenger contact between the FAB
headquarters and groups outside of Munich. MG became angered by
actions it saw as opportunistic. FAB took it upon itself to distribute
member identification cards implying official MG authorization, allow
members to carry weapons, and assume entitlements of officials. 77
In this early stage of the occupation, such rapid developments
proved too hazardous for MG. It appears that MG simply did not trust an
"anti-Nazi" organization so suddenly popular. The FAB was by far the
most powerful of the three prominent movements, and MG considered
such a group a clear refuge for opportunists with a past: "(the FABJ ....
offers an admirable mechanism for infiltration by former NSDAP
members either wishing to whitewash themswelves or to facilitate their
accomplishment of whatever long-term mission they might have been
assigned."78
MG's empowerment of the FAB lasted only two weeks. On May 15,
two CIC officers came to the FAB leaders, voiced harsh accusations and
made it clear that the FAB's influence must be diminished. Two days
later the officers returned to declare that, according to occupation
directives organizations like the FAB had to cease operation. CIC men
requisitioned the FAB files and closed the office.79 Regional MG of
Bavaria ordered that all FAB officials everywhere had to stop activities

77Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 130-131.
78BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/5, MGB Weekly, May 21, 1945, 6.
79wagner 165; Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 131.
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immediately.80 Regional MG considered the following the most
prominent "unsanctioned activities" of the FAB:81
(1) Representation of itself as the sole organization sponsored by
and sanctioned by Allied authorities, and as the sole and most
effective channel of approach to American Military Government.
(2) Granting by Gerngross to members of, or supporters of, his
organization of laisser-passer allowing travel, relaxation of curfew
restriction or firearms permits, without the concurrence of or
reference to AMG. Those permits were issued on the letterhead of
the FAB and signed by, or for, Gerngross.
(3) Unauthorized requisition by members of the FAB of vehicles
and buildings on their authority alone, representing themselves as
supported in their actions by U.S. authorities.
Whatever the official reasons, explanations and accusations
regarding FAB exclusion abound. Rebecca Boehling (358) suggests that
the FAB leaders' own decision to distance themselves from the CIC might
have contributed to the ban. Interestingly, the influential Cardinal
Faulhaber presumably played a role in the FAB's demise: the cardinal
not only disliked FAB leader Dr GerngroB --because he was Protestant
and married to a non-Bavarian-- but very likely "decreased MG's
confidence in the FAB."82 At the same time-- curiously-- Cardinal
Faulhaber, in a patriotic appeal, advised another FAB leader (and
Protestant), Dr Ottoheinrich Leiling, not to work too closely with the
Americans. 83

80BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/5, MGB Weekly, May 28, 1945, 9.
81BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/5, MGB Weekly, May 21, 1945, 6.
82 Boehling 361.
83Boehling 361.
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By the end of May MG clarified the limits of local German
initiative. On May 25 Munich MG announced that political parties,
organisations, groups or anti-Nazi groups and organizations were not
allowed to organize themselves, set up offices or hold gatherings of any
kind. Furthermore, they were not empowered to confiscate vehicles,
provisions or buildings. The distribution of posters, books, leaflets, and
other printed materials was forbidden. Any activities had to cease
immediately.84 Many Germans reportedly welcomed the move. Regional
MG found the population "well satisfied" with Munich MG's decision to
abolish all political organization: it was becoming "common knowledge
that the FAB was a non-reputable group whose leaders wanted to
establish themselves with Allied authorities to further their own
opportunistic ambitions." Meanwhile, some FAB members themselves
reportedly admitted that their organization was "getting out of hand."85
In a presumably sudden understanding of what was to come, many
in the FAB

si~ply

disappeared from the scene. The FAB and associated

groups faded fast, the many questionable members even faster. On the
outskirts of Munich and in the Southern Bavarian Landkreisen the
situation was the same. This summary of the FAB illustrates a common
fate:86
In both the Mies bach and the Bad Aibling area the Freiheits Aktion
Bayern was extremely active in the early days. During the Nazi

84chronik 54.
85BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/S,'MGB Weekly, May 28, 1945, 9.
86BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1 AHR Miesbach 2.
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regime a few men formed the core. Its inspiration was historic
Bavarian separatism and there does not seem to be in this area at
least, any record of active opposition among these men to the
NSDAP. In the last days of combat hundreds suddenly became
F.A.B. [sic]: those who might have originally formed a real
resistance movement were lost in the crowds of those climbing on
a new band-wagon. Many saw in the German defeat hope for an
independent Bavaria, many others hoped to hide their activity or
lack of it, under the F.A.B. banner. Until the quality of members of
the F.A.B. and their political aims became evident, the party had
some influence and through Military Government officers, placed
men in fairly important positions. As the true nature of the
movement became clear, those who had nothing more then their
F.A.B. association to recommend them, were replaced. Generally
the great majority of F.A.B. was absorbed into the CSU.
Regardless of internal problems, the somewhat dubious FAB was
destined for a fleeting role. After all, MG directives forbade any political
organization or cooperation. The cautious, strict Munich MG was much
more evident than the lenient one.
At the early stage of the occupation, MG preferred "indirect rule"
but restrained German "ambitions." Discipline, not democratization was
the goal. The preceding examples reveal how inconsistent this practice
could be in the first months of the occupation.
Although not without flaws, the effectual and well-trained Munich
detachment provides a clear example of proper, capable Military
Government. The Miesbach detachment, however, failed in some
important areas. Still, it is difficult to fault the Miesbach MG officers
given the impossible conditions and immense hurdles. For German
groups like the FAB, the fate was even more direct and damning.

CHAPTER IV

DEFINING AUTHORITY AND ASSURING PUBLIC SAFETY

The German defeat of May 1945 ended 12 years of a system that
expressed itself most directly by strictly enforcing order and exercising
complete control, or at least the widespread perception of it. US
occupiers found it suddenly necessary to fill the immense void of
contrived order by means as uncompromising and martial. Ambitious US
aims required from the beginning the strictest information control and
public safety policies for the goals to succeed at all. As any conquering
occupation force must do, American occupiers were obligated to rule
absolutely.
As obligated ruler, MG held the prominent responsibility "to
maintain and presetve law and order; and .... to restore normal
conditions among the civilian population as soon as possible.'' 1 To
maintain this law and order, or "public safety," MG was forced to assure
a secure environment for local civilians while at the same time strictly
con trolling them. 2 To eventually "allow" Germans to develop a fresh
perception of order according to democratic ideals and eventually nurture

1From CSS 551 in Holborn 137.
2 Some issues relevant to law and order -- military security,
intelligence, or political investigation, for example -- are worthy of a
whole study themselves, and are not stressed in these pages.
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from this void a rejuvenated system, the US occupier's form of control
would have to gradually assume a vezy different man!ler from those the
of Nazi past. The example of MG reestablishment of the Munich and
Bavarian police illustrates the challenges presented by creating and
guiding a new, untainted authority from the infamous old.
According to the considerations above, this chapter explores frrst
how MG clarified policy and assured a secure environment through strict
measures and the "direction" of information, and second the reactivation
and control of German police authority.

CLARIFYING THE NEW ORDER

Germany was a conquered enemy. Yet for MG to achieve the initial
task of "getting things going again," a-- relatively-- stable atmosphere
had to be established. MG, stated CSS 551, "Shall be firm .... [but) will
at the same time be just and humane with the respect to the civilian
population. "3 JCS 1067 nevertheless made it clear that circumstances
were not yet ripe for many freedoms:4
Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a
defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy
Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied
objectives.
Directly upon arrival, MG instituted a series of strict controls and
measures that clarified this new relationship. Reasons were two-fold:

3Holborn 136.
4JCS 1067 in Holborn 159.
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cautious militaty security and political requirements ("all Germans are
Nazis") determined one. The need for law and order determined the other,
and was presumably welcomed by German ciVilians. In the first months
and after, there were many threats to public safety: plundering and
widespread theft; murdering "robber bands;" and angcy, revengeful forced
laborers.
The rigid new order under MG was initially and not unexpectedly
quite restrictive, yet loosened even after the first months. The strict antifraternization law, for instance, was meant to assure distance between
occupier and occupied Germans. It soon became clear that not all
Germans were dangerous or Nazis, and the controversial ban was
gradually toned down.5 Speaking in public with Germans was allowed by
July 21,6 but was only "officially" lifted in the fall of 1945.7
The many occupation laws and proclamations are far too
numerous to list. The following brief rundown of immediate MG
measures in Munich illustrates the environment. CiVilians -- of any
nationality-- were kept inside by curfew from 7:00p.m. to 6:00a.m.
Those found outside could expect a prison sentence. Evacuated persons

5For reasons behind the indecisiveness regarding nonfraternization policy, see Ziemke, Army 321-7.
6chronik 64.
7Munchner Zeitung. Alliertes Nachrichtenblatt (hereafter
Miinchner), Sept. 22, 1945, 3. Of course, American Gls and Germans did
speak to each other, regardless of regulations. In any case, neither
marriages between American soldiers and German women nor the living
of soldiers in German homes was yet allowed (Mii. Zeitung, Sept. 29
1945, 2.
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were not allowed to return to Munich, and those inside Munich were not
allowed to leave, until further notice. Many main streets in the inner city
remained closed and off limits, primarily to secure passage for military
vehicles. Any vehicle found in these streets was immediately confiscated.
Plunderers were warned of the strictest sentencing. The theft. or
possession of US military property was highly forbidden, regardless of the

source.B Correspondence or communications of any kind, even by
messenger, were strictly forbidden. 9 Nevertheless, the ne\v regulations
also meant the end of old ones. On May 1 the black-out regulations in
effect since Sept. 3, 1939 -- lasting 2077 nights -- were lifted.1 0
It is important to consider briefly how MG communicated policy,
established its influence, and secured the environment. The Public Safety
Branch of MG considered one of its major achievements "the formulation
and execution of policy for the establishment and maintenance of law
and order." 11 This task was naturally crucial, yet the news of significant
MG policies had to readily reach the occupied.
During the combat period, the Psychological Warfare Division of
SHAEF (PWD/SHAEF) exercised the responsibility for "information

8Bay. Landeszeitung, May 18 1945, 1. The curfew was lessened-gradually -- over the following months.
9wagner 154. Most communication had already been disrupted;
postal services, for example, had stopped almost two weeks before the
first American troops arrived (Wagner 154).
1Ochronik 51.
11 BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 65-1 I 5, Public Safety Branch Annual
Report (hereafter PSBAR}, June 1946, 1.
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control." The Information Control Division (ICD/USFET) replaced PWD
with the disbandment of SHAEF in July, but without any noticeable
change in policy.12 Press policy was clearly formulated and implemented.
It involved three phases: 1) the ban of all German media; 2) the

establishment of Allied information services and-- corresponding to
denazification and democratization --an exact scrutiny of the German
media; and 3) the gradual transfer of media operations to Germans, but
under Allied controls. The short term policy goal was military, the long
term political. 13
How was the widespread clarification of MG accomplished, and law
and order furthered, under the chaotic circumstances? In the initial
occupation, the first two phases mentioned above were obvious. German
media remained banned, and MG's ICD informed the occupied of the
many proclamations and laws. As the American armies moved farther
into Germany, the Publishing Operations Branch of the lCD distributed
Mitteilungen ("Bulletins") for the German population. The main purpose
of these were to: 1) make public all laws, proclamations, orders, and

12Elisabeth Matz, Die Zeitungen der US-Armee fur die deutsche
Bevolkerung (1944-46) (Munster: Verlag C. J. Fahle, 1969) 47. On Allied
propaganda and press policy: Deutsche Presse seit 1945, ed. Harry Pross,
(Bern: Scherz, 1965 ); Norbert Frei, Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik und
deutsche Presse-tradition. Die Geschichte der Nachkriegszeitung
Siidostkurier (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986); Hans Habe, Im Jahre Null:
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Presse (Munich: Verlag Kurt
Desch, 1966); Harold Hurwitz, Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse. Die
amerikanische Pressepolitik in Deutschland 1945-49 (Cologne: [publisher
n/a}, 1972); Larry Hartenian, "The Role of Media in Democratizing
Germany: United States Occupation Policy 1945-49," Central European
History, 20.2 (1987): 145-190.
13Matz 20-21.
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other important information; 2) provide reports in local areas on how
daily life should continue under MG; and 3) "stabilize" conditions, by
curbing rumors through the release of exact information.l4
By the end of hostilities a more thorough brand of "newspaper"
was developed, published by a central editorial staff, and provided to the
German population. These combined official announcements with local
sections, commentary, and world news. Nevertheless, the layout
remained sparse, the approach stern. Despite objections from the
editorial staff, an "engaging" character was to be avoided.15 It was too
soon for this. General McClure, commander of lCD, made it clear that "It
is PWD's policy not to entertain Germans." Moreover, he clarified, the
Germans do not need to form their own opinions, they "have to be
told.'' 16
By the time US forces had reached Southern Bavaria, a more
extensive form of occupation newspaper had been established, and
allowed local MG to clarify its goals effectively. Munich had been without
printed news since April 30, 1945, when the Miinchner Neueste
Nachrichten halted its operations. On May 18, MG published the first
Bayerische

Landeszeitun~.

It appeared only three times, reached a total

circulation of 328,00, and ended its run on June 1. The Landeszeitun~

14Matz 31.
15Matz 37-41. New for German readers was the clear distinction
between news and commentary indicative of American media. This style
of objective reporting was adapted by the renewed postwar German press.
16Matz 43-44.
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was followed by the Miinchner

Zeitun~.

which appeared weekly from June

9 until the end of September, and achieved a circulation of 600,000.17
The papers only appeared periodically, but contributed nevertheless to
clearing up major information gaps and helped MG stabilize the local
situation. In the section "Die Militiirregiemng gibt bekannt" ("Military
Government announces"), for example, MG clarified policies, announced
ordinances and regulations, and warned of punishments for threatening
law and order.
Still, the MG newspapers could only reach so many. The shortage
of paper made it difficult to facilitate increased newspaper circtulation.
Other methods were also used. Munich MG printed and distributed
·posters stating regulations, prohibiting political organization, and so
forth. By July, Munich's ICD officers were operating two sound trucks for ·
official announcements, and by August had made them available to the
Public Safety section "for cases of special emergency:·18
Another media form -- radio -- assisted MG greatly, but its
significance has been mostly ignored. It is important to note that the
number of functioning radios was incredibly high; in Bavaria there were
at least a million. Apart from initial technical problems arising from

17oagmar Wiedenhorn-Schnell, "Medlen an der Longe: Deutsche
Lizenzpresse in Miinchen 1945-49," Triirrunerzeit in Miinchen. Kultur
und Gesellschaft einer deutschen Gro13stadt im Aufbruch 1945-49, ed.
Friedrich Prinz, (Munich: Beck, 1984) 252. The first postwar Germanowned newspaper in Munich, the Siiddeutsche Zeitun~, was licensed by
MG on October 6, 1945.
18BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR97.
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devastation and plundering, broadcasting was the only official organ free
from material and circulation hindrances in this period, 19 provided
electrical power was available.
By May 11, the lCD section was able to begin broadcasting from
the badly damaged station of the former "Reichsender Miinchen."20 MG
broadcasters, calling themselves "Radio Miinchen," began the first
broadcast by issuing proclamations: "Hier ist Radio Miinchen, ein Sender
der Militarregierung. Einwohner Miinchens! Die Militarregierung gibt
bekannt, daj3 .... "21 At first the broadcasts ran only twice daily,22 one

and a half hours long, but soon increased after a more suitable studio
was found.23 Mayor Scharnagl was able to deliver a censored radio talk
on May 12.24 Listeners found the Radio Miinchen schedule in the lCD
newspapers.

19,Rudiger Bolz, "Von Radio Miinchen zum Bayertschen
Rundfunk," Triimmerzeit in Miinchen. Kultur und Gesellschaft etner
deutschen GroBstadt im Aufbruch 1945-49, ed. Friedrich Prinz, (Munich:
Beck, 1984) 240.
20BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 97. This was the
same station from which in the last days the FAB proclaimed its revolt
and, after SS troops had regained it, Gauleiter Giesler issued his last
proclamation (Bolz 240).
21Bolz 240: "You're listening to Radio Munich, the Military
Government broadcaster. Citizens of Munich! The Military Government
announces that .... "(translation by this author).
22chronik 50.
23Bolz 241.
24BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 97

62
REACTIVATING GERMAN POLICE AUTHORITY

The examples of media, or "information control," illustrate how
directly and comprehensively MG dominated German society. Such
ardent and intensive practice of control had limits, however, even in
police matters. In the early months of the occupation, military police and
tactical troops were the ultimate guardians of law and order,25 but could
not patrol indefinitely.
The preference for indirect rule demanded that MG reestablish
local German police as soon as possible, but under strict MG direction.
The practical goal of MG's Public Safety Section --establishing law and
order-- was not, even in the initial stage, divorced from wider political
goals. Public Safety staff were responsible for "the purging,
reorganization, and reactivation of the German police agencies," as well
as "supervision and control" of these agencies "in accordance with
Military Government requirements."26 Within a year MG had made
significant strides towards these goals, but not without dilemmas.
Developments in Munich during the first months of police reactivation
illustrate the challenges and predicaments MG, and the German police,
had to overcome.

25As late as July of 1946 "all important incidents" were "reported
instantaneously" to the Provost Marshall and to the Military Police
Headquarters in Munich (BayHStA OMGB[Y] 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR
5).
26BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 1. For one of the few
ample descriptions of police policy, see: Robert M. W. Kempner, "Police
Administration," Governing 403-418.
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Allied planners considered certain German police bodies -- in the
same manner as military and para-military organizations-- to be
thoroughly "Nazified." According to the occupation directives, MG was to
"seize and preserve all records and plans of the German military
organizations and of the Nazi Party, and of the Security, Criminal, and
Ordinruy Police. "2 7 The police agencies most directly under Nazi party
control-- the Reich Criminal Police (Reichskriminalpolizei) and the
Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) -- were to be abolished. Not all police
were to be disbanded initially. The standard criminal and ordinary police
were only to be "purged of Nazi personnel and put to use under the
control and supervision of the Military Government."28
MG was to reactivate "acceptable" German police immediately -- in
the service of, and under the control of, MG. General Eisenhower, in a
directive outlining and elucidating guidelines for police authority,
decreed the following: "in general German local police carry the
responsibility for maintenance of law and order, subordinate to MG
control."29
Naturally, US troops and Military Police were available for support,
especially in extreme conditions. Furthermore, army planners eventually
developed the bold idea of maintaining an elite force of police-type

27From CSS 551 in Holborn 137. The same decree, with slightly
different wording, is in JCS 1067 (Holbom 161).
28From JCS 1067, Holborn 163.
29Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2 (translation from
"Griindsatze im Polizeiwesen" by this author).
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occupation troops, the US Constabulaty, to "assist German Civilian
Police where necessary in controlling disorder caused by marauding
bands of lawless individuals and to cooperate with German Police in the
general maintenance of law and order."30 Despite enthusiasm, a lack of
resources and troops kept the US Constabulaty an impressive but
relatively insignificant force. 31
Regardless, US forces could not expect to provide policing
indefinitely. In Munich, for example, the Public Safety Section
complained about the lack of US troops available for security purposes, a
"security troop problem" Munich MG was watching very closely. By
December 1945 less than 1000 US soldiers made up the "occupational
security force." As a response, in the same month a security brigade of
the Yugoslav Army was ordered to Munich, and comparties of armed
Polish soldiers carried out guard duty at certain installations.32
As soon as capitulation appeared certain, Germans attempted to
construct agencies for securing law and order. In areas in and near
Munich, local Germans identifying themselves with the FAB or related
anti-Nazi groups made themselves Biirgermeister and Police chiefs or
were assigned the task by the local population. In most cases the first US

30sayHStA OMGB(Y) 9 I 18-1 14, "Operational Procedure: US
Constabulary, Militaty Government, and German Police Agencies, June
12, 1946" (hereafter Op. Procedure).
31ziemke, Army 339-341; Davis 166-174.
32BayHStA OMGB(Y) COI4451 1, Op. Report, Dec. 1945, 3: The
Yugoslavian brigade consisted of five companies of roughly 10,000
"trained Army troops" of Yugoslavian nationality, directly commanded by
their own General.
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troops did not object, 33 presumably appreciating the assistance. Few of
these initial eager attempts lasted. Most of these hopefuls were soon
dismissed by MG on account of unacceptable past activities.34
In Munich on April 30 -- the day the first US units entered the city
-- local "anti-Nazis" attempted to form a type of auxiliazy police force.
Members of the anti-Nazi group "07" (see chapter III) named one of their
members, Willi WelBman, leader of a body they called the "Bayerische
Hiifspoltzei" (Bavarian Auxiliazy Police). They began to recruit "policemen"

and distribute identification cards. On the night of April 30 -- the night
before the Munich MG detachment arrived -- WeiBmann appeared at the
Rathaus to request MG blessing for his operation. American troops there
put him off until the next day, when he could then take up his proposal
with more responsible authorities. WeiBmann continued his operation
nevertheless. In the printing room of the Volkischen Beobachter he and
his men printed up leaflets warning against plundering and distributed
them the next morning. 35
Munich MG's response to such initiative was swift and decisive.
On the same morning, on May 1, WeiBmann appeared again at the
Rathaus. Recently arrived MG officers there had no time for WeiBmann,
and quickly put an end to the activities of the "Bayerische Htifspolizei."
MG forbade the leaflets and ordered WeiBmann's force to disband.36

33wagner 144
34BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 5.
35wagner 144.
36wagner 148-49.
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Munich MG asserted direct control over the police situation. MG
officers were at this time searching for their own man to head an official
police force, under the direction of MG's Public Safety Section.37
Demonstrating the "pragmatism" indicative of the early phase of the
occupation, MG sought a competent, yet seemingly acceptable candidate
active before 1933. On the afternoon of May 1, MG commander Kurtz's
assistant Major Keller sent two of his officers to the Bogenhausen
section of Munich in search of MG's first choice for Police Chief. The
men had orders to locate the 71- year-old former Chief of the Bayerische
Landespolizei (Bavarian State Police), Hans Ritter von Seisser.38 Seisser

had played a decisive role in the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch of
November 9, 1923. Seisser, as head of the Munich police
(Polizeipriisident), ordered the suppression of the revolt. 39

Seisser was brought to Major Keller, who asked him to take the
office of Police Chief. Seisser accepted, then changed his mind. He
claimed he would be too busy with his manufacturing business. Twentyfour hours later. Keller and Seisser met again. This time Keller demanded
he take the post, and reminded him he could be forced to take it. Seisser

37MG records unfortunately report little about the officers of the
Munich Detachment Public Safety Section. A roster of the detachment
. for December 1945 (BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19,
1945, 7) lists four Public Safety Section officers: Maj. Frank C. Smith
(date joined detachment n/a); Capt. Gerald Greene Uoined detachment
Aug. 16, 1945); Maj. Clarence A. Brown (joined detachment Apr. 14,
1945); and Capt. William G. O'Brien (joined detachment June 28, 1945).
38obermaier, and Mauerer 30.
39Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2.
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conceded, but under the condition that he receive no salary or
compensation.40 On May 7 Seisser was officially named Police Chief.41
Not surprisingly, the first days of police reestablishment in Munich
were difficult. The demands of war had already ravaged the ranks of the
Munich department: 263 officials lost their lives, and 52 were reported
missing; 17 4 police reserves were killed, 97 reported missing, and 1, 000
were in various prisoner-of-war camps in 1945.42 Upon the arrival of US
troops, the Criminal Police were suspended. Uniformed patrolmen
(Schutzpolizel -- literally: Protection Police) were either in custody or

remained in their homes untouched. Policemen with much to hide had
fled long ago to the country or beyond. Precincts and station houses were
mostly closed up or abandoned.43
The situation soon changed under Seisser and the Public Safety
Section's direction. On May 7 Munich police personnel comprised only
100 patrolmen and 125 criminal police. Screening and "vetting" of
personnel continued daily, yet at the same time concerted efforts were
made to recruit new policemen. Remarkably, by the end of the month,
MG reckoned the number of total police employees to have reached an
amazing 3,700.44 Seisser appeared to receive full MG support, and

40obermaier, and Mauerer 30-31. The reasons for this request are
unclear, but were presumably altruistic.
41BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44.
42suddeutsche, December 7, 1945, 3.
43obermaier, and Mauerer 31.
44BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44.
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cooperation seemed successful. Evecy morning meetings between Public
Safety Branch officers and Munich pollee were held to discuss the events
of the last 24 hours, as well as future measures.45
Despite this apparent rebirth of the Munich police, the situation
soon changed. Finding "acceptable" police personnel became the most
significant problem. As mentioned, MG efforts to reestablish local
German administration were marked by dilemmas. MG was to initiate
plans but dominate affairs as little as possible. Nevertheless, figures with
a connection to the Nazi party had to be shut out, at first according to a
combination of MG judgment and useful CIC intelligence information.
The early emphasis on efficiency, especially before the July directive,
caused various specialized sections of MG to apply denazification
irregularly. 46
The Munich MG Public Safety Section prematurely reported in late
May that "the de-nazification of the present police force is approximately
two- thirds over and proceeding as quickly as conditions permit. "4 7 In
fact, the authentic purge was yet to come. With more thorough
formulation of denazification policy, the recruitment of suitable
personnel became even more problematic. With the MG directive of July
7, 1945, a clear-cut denazification policy was set in motion. Categories of

45obermaier, and Mauerer 55. Seisser reportedly appreciated the
proficiency of what he considered well trained and organized Public
Safety officers (55}.
46Ntethammer, Entnazifizierung 147-50.
47BayHStA OMGB(Y}10/85-3/5, Weekly MG Munich, May 13-20,
1945.

69
Germans to be denazified, and released from positions, were introduced.
Included in the frrst categocy, those who were to receive mandatory
dismissal, were all ordinacy police officials from the top down to
lieutenant, regardless of Nazi party membership.48 Already before July,
Munich MG began to apply a more strict and comprehensive
denazification. On June 16 MG announced that all municipal officials
(Beamte), employees (Angestellte), and workers (Arbeiter) who had joined

the Nazi party or associated organizations before Januruy 30, 1933,
would immediately lose their positions.49
In June the police denazification was begun anew. MG Public
Safety acted to suspend and purge the entire police department, with the
goal of establishing "from the ground up an efficient and thoroughly
denazified Police Department. "50 A gap in Fragebogen processing -discussed in the previous chapter-- might partially explain why MG
Public Safety waited as long as it did to act, and allowed the police
department to expand in May. Regardless, MG reports for June cite a
specific reason for prompting the action: extensive Nazi party
membership records were discovered, 51 revealing that most of the police
personnel were somehow affiliated to the Nazi party. 52 The entire

48Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 153.
49chronik 58.
50BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, June 3-10, 1945.
51BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, June 3-10, 1945.
52BayHStA OMGB(Y) CO/ 451/2, Op. Report, July 8, 1945, 29.
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department was officially suspended on June 5, 1945, and a minimal
staff was kept on to take care of administrative tasks. 53
A few officials cleared by investigation were appointed to serve as
the basis for a new force. 54 Police President Seisser was one of those few
officials. He managed to last in his post until MG dismissed him in midAugust. The causes for this are not entirely clear. The only brief account
of Seisser's dismissal states that, despite his role in the Beer Hall
Putsch, MG discovered that in the last years of the Weimar Republic
Seisser had gotten too close to the increasingly influential Nazi party. 55
In any case, an outside MG observer reported in July that although "not
a Nazi (Seisser] is not aggressive and his removal is being considered ... 55
Seisser might have lasted so long only because it took weeks of
negotiations and consideration before the new candidate could be
persuaded to take the police chief post. 57 As Seisser's successor MG
appointed a more satisfactocy choice; one With no conceivable
connection to the Nazi party: Franz Xavier Pitzer, 58, a Catholic, and
SPD member from 1903 until 1933. Pitzer was a trained craftsman and
carpenter, and a union member. In 1918-19 he organized the Bavarian

53sayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, June 3-10, 1945.
54sayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 45.
55soehling 376. Curiously, the pages in Chronik (47, 50) Boehling
quoted for this information deal With events of May -- Seisser's
appointment, for example -- and include no mention of Seisser's
dismissal whatsoever.
56BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/451/2, Op. Report, July 8, 1945, 29.
57It is unclear whether Seisser knew of these developments.
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Military Police and seiVed as assistant police chief (Vizeprdsident) under
the Independent Socialist Staimer. Thereafter, Pitzer decided to quit
rather than serve under the reactionary Police President Pohner. He
withdrew to civilian life after 1919.58
Pitzer assumed the post on Aug. 16, 1945.59 It appears MG wanted
to show off the new appointment -- and department -- to its Miinchner.
In a notable piece of "information control," a long, flattering article in
the sober MG Miinchner Zeitun2 introduced Pitzer. Pitzer's first quoted
comments were reported as follows: "The policeman comes from the
people, and is there for the people; he must be the best friend of the
people."60
MG's new man Pitzer seemed a more acceptable appointee, and
lasted in his office for a good time. There is an ironic note to all this,
however: later, in 1949, MG would advise then OB Wimmer to dismiss
Pitzer. A MG report found the Munich police the worst organized and
managed force in all of Bavaria, and blamed Pitzer for having not the
slightest elementacy understanding of police administration.61
Furthermore, Pitzer -- known as a stalwart opponent of the burgeoning

58Munchner, August 25, 1945, 3.
59chronik 69.
60Munchner, August 25, 1945, 3 (this author's translation): "Der
Polizist kommt aus dem Volk, under ist dajiir das Volk; er muj3 der beste
Freund des Volkes sein."
61Hans Wacker, "Miinchner Kommunalpolitik nach 1945:
NachlaBverwaltung oder demokratische Erneuerung?," Triimmerzeit in
Miinchen. Kultur und Gesellschaft einer deutschen GroBstadt im
Aufbruch 1945-49, ed. Friedrich Prinz, (Munich: Beck, 1984) 56.
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black market -- was himself found to be involved in "illegal
transactions. "62
Constant reorganization of the Munich police continued
throughout 1945. In June it appeared the department was less of a factor
in the maintenance of law and order than at the end of hostilities. As
mentioned, on June 5 the entire department was suspended. On June 11
MG officially ordered a department reorganization, and in the days
thereafter the number of officials grew, but only slowly. On June 12, 8
detectives (Krtminalpolizei) were on duty; by June 22 there were 22. In
normal times there were normally 300 detectives on duty in Munich.63
By June 20 police precincts recommenced operation, but only to a
limited extent. 64
Reorganization did progress. At any rate, the ability of Munich
policemen to act independent of MG was limited at this early stage.
General Eisenhower's aforementioned directive decreed that German
police were to be disarmed and remain that way; only for special
emergency cases could certain groups be equipped with small arms and
strictly limited ammunition. 65 Early on Police Chief Seisser had

62Julia~e Wetzel, '"Mir szeinen doh:' Miinchen und Umgebung als
Zuflucht von Uberlebenden des Holocaust 1945-48," Von Stalin2rad zur
Wahrungsreform: Znr Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland,
eds. Martin Brozsat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1988) 356.

63obermaier, and Mauerer 55.
64chronik 59. Registration desks (Meldestellen) were only open 8
am- 12 pm Monday through Saturday (Miinchner, June 23, 1945, 2}.
65say. Landeszeitung, March 25, 1945, 2.
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requested arms as well as uniforms for his men; he was told that arms
were neither authorized nor available.66 In this period the police carried
only truncheons, which had little effect against armed plunderers and
marauders. 67 Lack of proper equipment was naturally a constant
problem. Under MG regulations, former uniforms had to be dyed and
altered to avoid any resemblance to militaristic Nazi era uniforms. 68
Funding was an initial problem. Between May and June many officials
went weeks without any pay.69
Munich police remained under close MG guidance, and were only
gradually, after proving themselves, given full responsibility to carry out
their work. The following MG report excerpt illustrates this: 70
German police were detailed to foot traffic duty, working with
Military Police. It was planned, that ·at such time as they were
deemed fit to assume their independent duties without the aid of
MP's they would be put on independent duty, and another group of
civilian policemen would be detailed with the Military Police.
Certain matters remained under the jurisdiction of Military Police. The
detention and imprisonment of Displaced Persons (DPs), for example,
was forbidden to German police. The Allied Powers had declared DPs
United Nations nationals. Whenever German Police arrested DPs, they

66BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44.
67wacker 55.
68BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44.
69obermaier, and Mauerer 55. MG eventually obtained· police
funds from the Staatsbank (55), but the funding troubles continued.
70BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 47.
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were required to immediately tum them over to US authorities, provide
arrest reports, and report the arrest to MG.71
It was difficult to find men for the police at this stage because of

their abject rewards and reputation, as well as the fact that a
satisfactory Fragebogen was required. 72 Under these conditions the
Public Safety section felt it necessary to start a recruiting drive,
intensified by radio broadcasts and newspaper appeals. This appears to
have contributed to somewhat rapid growth. By August the total number
of employees had reached 1 ,039, broken down in the following groups;
711 patrolmen, 125 detectives, 170 administrators and 35 housekeeping
personnel. 73
Reinstatements also contributed to the notable rise in personnel,
but the buildup was inconsistent. During the first week of September, for ·
example, "28 men were discharged, 240 were reinstated and 280
applications for employment were rejected." MG managed to maintain
police numbers by constant shuffling of police personnel from one
capacity to another.74 The following chart from MG documents
illustrates police growth from August until October 1945:75

71BayHStA OMGB(Y) 9/18-1/4, "Op. Procedure," June 12, 1946.
72obermaier, and Mauerer 54.
73BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 47.
74BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 48.
75BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 51.
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Categories of Personnel:
Uniformed Police
Criminal Police
Administration
House Keeping [sic J
Total:

August 31
1,349
188

257
2
1,796

sent 30
1,367
236
395
78

·Oct 31
1,270
271
419
87

2,076

2,047

By December 1945 reorganization and purging resulted in the folloWing
totals: 172 administrative officials , 155 criminal police and 421
patrolmen had been dismissed. New appointments included 122
administrative officials, 75 criminal police, and 555 patrolmen. Almost
Without exception the new appointments were native Bavarians, from all
walks of life. 76 Personnel instability certainly did not end in 1945. Many
future aspirants proved "unacceptable" because of their pasts, and others
unsuitable for police work.
Meanwhile, other problems of police reorganization were being
slowly, partially resolved. Arming of the police was permitted in the fall.
In negotiations With MG, municipal authorities made a concerted effort
to convince MG of the necessity for arms. 77 This contributed to MG's
decision, but the Public Safety Branch was reaching the same conclusion
on its own. An August 1945 report determined that the "arming of the
police remained the major problem .... unarmed men cannot be
expected to rest- behind the protection of a uniform or police card. "78

76suddeutsche, December 7, 1945, 3.
77wacker 55.
78BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1 I 4, Munich AHR 48.
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By Januacy 1946, Munich MG considered its initial rebuilding of
the Munich Police Department largely over. There were still many
problems to be solved-- reports indicate a lack of sufficient funding, for
example.79 Still, MG Public Safety proudly judged its efforts successful.
The following MG report passage summarizes Munich MG's
assessments:80
The Munich Police Department had almost completed its
reorganization and was considered to be one of the finest in the
American Zone. The Uniformed Police are completely dressed in the
new uniform of Royal Blue and Black trimmed with Silver Grey,
and are equipped with breast shields of American design. The
Police are armed with carbines and pistols of Italian make. There
were, as of yet, not enough weapons to arm all the Police
individually. Another handicap was the lack of sufficient vehicles
in good condition to establish road patrols. At this time no motor
patrols were in action. Telephone and teletype remained the
principal means of communication. Radio transmitter was
available, however, Radios for police cars had been requested but,
as yet no action had been taken in this matter.
In December 1945 an outside MG observer judged the situation not as
favorably:81
.... [the Munich police force], as now constituted, consists of
2,200 men and their efficiency is believed to be rapidly improving
due to the continuous training on the job and the selection of
most efficient personnel. It is reported that they need additional
supply of small arms. Also, the Det has been unable to secure
sufficient uniforms due to hold-up of material by the freeze at

79BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 78-1 I 4, Munich AHR 51.
80BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10178-114, Munich AHR 52. In an effort to
avoid militaristic connotation, the uniforms were designed after the
American example: the tunics had a much looser cut, rank was displayed
on the arms instead of on the shoulders, and the peaked cap introduced
(Miinchner, July 28, 1945, 2 ).
81BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2.
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Third Army Hq. They report the Police Force has only 319 uniforms
out of 1,410 required. They also require 1,100 overcoats.
Moreover, Munich MG reported to this source that "The efforts of the Det
[sic] are practically exhausted to obtain supplies for local police."82 The
attention to equipment concerns reveal how MG was burdened with
many problems in addition to the demands of carrying out denazification
directives.
It would take much more than American-style police blues or

police car radios to turn the German police into a capable force. Still, by
the spring of 1946 MG already considered many of its direct goals largely
fulfilled. MG began to "adVise," instead of "direct," a German police force
gradually more independent of MG. The new German police would not
operate under the sort of structure-- and jurisdiction-- it had before or
during the Third Reich. A broader occupation goal was in play at this
time, a product of the wish for not only a denazified but also a
democratized Germany reformed "from the ground up." A series of
directives stated how this applied to police reconstruction. General
Eisenhower's guidelines for police authority emphasized that the police
force was to be decentralized and rebuilt regionally and locally, as a
component of local laws and administration. 83 A significant MG
directive of July 7, 1945 further formulated this line as well as the
decrees ofCSS 551 and JCS 1067. Organizational guidelines for the
police were essentially finalized in MG regulations of February 1, 1946.84

82BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2.
83Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2.
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Before 1933, German police agencies had been largely subordinate
only to each state's Interior Ministry (Innenministerium). During the Third
Reich the police became more and more centralized under
Gleichschaltung, the practice of forcing or bringing all agencies in line

under Nazi party authority. In Bavaria, this process began in 1935 when
the Landpolizei (Provincial, or State Police; responsible for the state of
Bavaria as a whole) was made subordinate to the Reich. Since 1933
preparations had been made to incorporate the Landpolizei into the
Reichswehr (the German Army from 1921-1935). The Criminal

Investigations Police (Kriminalpolizei) and the Border Police (Grenzpolizel)
were also centralized. In 1936 all police authority was made the
responsibility of the Reich Interior Ministry. Rural police remained, but
in practice were highly controlled by the consolidated police agencies85
Decentralization under MG intended to create an organizational
structure of police authority modeled on the American and English
example. Jurisdiction and local responsibility were to be clearly defined.
The goal was to create a situation whereby, as the Public Safety Branch
described, "The police are subject to the will of the people instead of
being used to enforce the will of the state upon the people. "86

84Handbuch der bayertschen Amter. Gemeinden und Gerichte
1799-1980, ed. Wilhelm Volkert, (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983) 54: The directive's title was "Administration
of Military Government in the US Zone" (see also chapter II).
85Handbuch 53; Kempner, Governing 403-406.
86BayHStA OMGB(Y} 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 1. Due to largely political
and financial constraints, the German police gradually became more
centralized than originally planned (Kempner, Governing 411-418).
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Municipal police were put under the authority of the Mayor
(Oberbiirgermeister). He was required to establish a unified city police

force which was headed by a chief of police and functioned within the
city as a unit of municipal administration. Each mayor had the total
administrative responsibility for the municipal police and exercised full
control over property, facilities, and suitable personnet87
In Munich this new structure was novel. Since 1898 Munich
municipal police headquarters (Polizeidlrektion or Polizelpriisidium) was
under Bavarian state control. 88 As part of its reorganization plans,
Munich MG ordered the police to be integrated back into the municipal
administration. Incidentally, the City Council (Stadtrat) gratefully
received this chance to control municipal police authority. In the Weimar
period, the city had felt it had to contribute too much to state police
funding; at the same time it was constantly unsatisfied with municipal
police performance and procedure.89
Cities of less than five thousand citizens were permitted to
organize a police department. These local community police
(Gemeindepolizei) were under the command of either the local ciVilian

councilor (Gemeinderat) or mayor. If a department was not created, the
local civilian governmental head could arrange With the Minister of the
Interior for policing}rom the ranks of the Landpolizei. If created, this

87BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 2.
88Handbuch 51. Between 1923 and 1929 many large Bavarian
cities adopted this example.
89wacker 55.
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form of police force was to have full authority throughout the county
(Landkreis) in which they resided. In actual practice they would not go

out of the city or community in which they were located unless they
received a special request from the Landpolizei. 90
On the state (Land) level, MG reorganized the Landpolizei so that
there was a Landpolizei headquarters in each Landkreis. The Landpolizei
were allowed full jurisdiction throughout the state in which they
operated. The Landpolizel were to assist the city police only in special
cases; when requested to do so by the chief civilian governmental
authority or by the Minister of the Interior.91 Correspondingly, MG
ordered that the Landpolizei be under the command of the Ministty of the
Interior. 92
At the end of July 1945, MG named Michael Freiherr von Godin as
the first head of the Landpolizei. Interestingly, Godin also had a decisive
part in foiling the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Godin, then a police
lieutenant, was at the head of a group of initially only 33 policemen
facing 2,000 armed Nazi putschists.93 When Hitler came into power the
Gestapo put a death sentence on Godin. He was forced to flee to
Switzerland where he continued to actively oppose the Nazi regime. MG
called him back from Switzerland to take the post.94

90BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR2; Handbuch 55.
91BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 2.
92Handbuch 56.
93chronik 66.
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MG stressed the reestablishment of Border Police. Initially, Border
Police were to cooperate with US tactical troops in controlling the
international boundaries of Germany. During the period from October
1945 to Februacy 1946 a foundation for this organization was created,
and MG instructed the Minister President of Bavaria to give "special
attention and high priority" to the organization of the Border
authorities.95 The November 15, 1945 ordinance of the Bavarian
Ministcy of the Interior reestablished the Border Police as an official
component of the Ministry of the Interior. 96 MG hoped to involve
German authorities as soon as possible in the efforts to solidify the long
Bavarian borders of the US Zone of occupation.
By the fall of 1945, US MG exercised complete control of the
German population. MG strictly manipulated the media and police
authority, two fundamentals of assuring law and order. That turned out
to be the easy part under the circumstances. The hard part would come
as MG attempted to guide Germans towards asserting a degree of local
law and order themselves. As the next chapter reveals, challenging and
peculiar crime problems severely complicated this process for MG and
German authorities alike.

94Munchner, July 28, 1945, 2.
95BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 3.
96Handbuch 57.

CHAPTER V

LAW AND ORDER ISSUES

In the early period of the occupation, "political" law and order
among Germans was secured. The dreaded "werewolves" and other forms
of resistance or anarchy never posed a clear threat. MG for Bavaria
satisfactorily reported in July 1945 that the German population in the
American Zone was generally orderly and obediant, and there were no
significant disturbances. I German POWs caused MG few problems. In
January 1946, Munich MG declared that "There was no indication of any
organized German resistance to any American authority .... and there
was [sic] no indications of any trouble with ex-Wehrmacht men."2
Although there was very little political disorder, there was
widespread criminal disorder. Criminal issues and dilemmas were fueled
by the extreme chaos, destruction, and powerlessness brought on by a
brutal war. Local crimes that were illegal under both MG mandates and

lgtd. in Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 137. Citing reasons behind
the lack of resistance, the German historian Lutz Niethammer
(Entnaziflzierung 137) points to consistent apathy among the bulk of the
German population during the early occupation. See also: Ziemke, Army
354-355.
2BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1 I 4, Munich AHR 51. Since returning
Wehrmacht POWs posed little threat their situation will not be

considered in these pages.
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applicable German laws were also characteristic of crime problems
throughout the US Zone.3
Certain groups of Displaced Persons posed great and innumerable
challenges to law and order. They were liberated persecutees, yet
suddenly became criminal offenders. This problematic status made their
control a major issue for both MG and German authorities.
MG's decisiveness as military "ruler" helped to keep the problems
in check. The relative security of much of the population in Southern
Bavaria was generally assured, 4 and order maintained. Still, even the
threat of widespread criminal issues severely challenged the proper
administration of the occupation. The issues were formidable, remained
significant. and constitued only the first hurdles. As the German
authorities became increasingly independent, they found themselves
having to face an abundance of similar problems in the later occupation
period.

3For brief examination of crime issues and the rural situation, see
Paul Erker, "Revolution des Dorfes? Landliche Bevolkerung zwischen
Fliichtlingsstrom und Landwirtschaftlichem Strukturwandel," Von
Stalingrad zur Wahrungreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in
Deutschland, Ed. Martin Brozsat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans
Woller, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988) 367-425. Naturally, US Army
personnel committed many crimes. That issue is not illustrated in these
pages, however.
4wacker 55.
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CAPITULATION, CHAOS, AND CRIME

Plundering was a major issue in the chaotic early days of the
occupation. Occupation historian Earl F. Ziemke notes that "Since the
US troops, German civilians, and DPs all looted, there was some debate
over whose behavior was the most reprehensible."5 Americans could
argue they had only done what armies had rightfully done for centuries.
DPs could justify that they were only taking what they needed to get by.
By stealing from each other, Germans had the weakest defense, yet most
Germans looted only very early on and in many cases returned what they
had lifted after MG pressure.6
Looters faced the harshest penalties in the waning Third Reich. In
Munich on February 16, 1945, for example, a 26-year-old woman was
sentenced to death for plundering committed after an Allied bombing
attack. Nevertheless, widespread plundering began well before the
capitulation. 7 Events signifying the sure end of Nazi authority
encouraged plunderers. At about the time of the FAB revolt on April28,
plundering broke out in almost all areas ofMunich.s
The first plunderings involved all sorts of individuals, groups,
objectives, and goods. On Sunday, April29, the SS squads assigned to

5ziemke, Army251.
6ziemke, Army251-252.
7chronik 29.
Schronik 42.
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guard the Filhrerbau (Fuhrer Building) and the Nazi party administrative
building decided to flee. Unexpectedly, the guards left both buildings on
the Konigplatz undamaged. In the air raid cellar of the Fiihrerbau and
connected passages the SS men left behind a collection of art "procured"
during the years of triumph: 259 paintings from Dutch masters of the
seventeenth century, from Parts; and 350 paintings intended for a future
Hitler collection (Hitler-Sammlung) in Linz. Surprtzed looters snatched
up the unexpected bounty.9 Many of these works were later recovered,
however. In December 1945 Munich MG issued radio and press notices to
the public offering amnesty for the return of such objects. The plan
proved "so successful" that MG extended it to include illegal possession
of any looted art objects ("removed from any repository"), and lengthened
the time for the return of such objects-- or the offer of information --to
March 1, 1946.10
The looters storming these cardinal Nazi centers were not looking
for art, or necessarily revenge. These suddenly fearless first bands
consisted of all types: deprived forced laborers, normally proper small

9obermaier, and Mauerer 19-20. "Kunst-Sondeifiihrer" (Special Art
Authority) Goering bought the Dutch paintings in 1942-43 from the
Vichy government (19).
10BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1 I 3 Munich MG Monthly Historical
Report (hereafter: MG Monthly) for January, 1946, 26: "The clause
referring to amnesty has been strengthened to further assure the people
that no action of any kind will be taken against them for the return of
art works or for information regarding such works. This office received
commendation from higher headquarters for instigating the action above.
Approximately 35 paintings of great value have so far been recovered as
well as other art objects."
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businessmen, bourgeois professionals and simple housekeepers. II They
were hardened by countless bombings, motivated by envy and hunger,
and fearful of future famine and crisis.
Provisions in storage were the main targets. Munich had long been
the most important storage and transfer center in Southern Bavaria.
Warehouses and cellars were stuffed with goods off-limits to, but
ingrained in the consciousness of locals and forced laborers allke.l2
Wehrmacht storehouses and rations depots were the first to be ravaged.

Beer cellars, department stores, customs terminals, warehouses, even
apartments known to be well-stocked were then raided. Munich's
Biirgerbriiukeller, for example, established as the "Relchstellejilr Fette und
Kase" (Reich Depot for Fat and Cheese), was thoroughly pillaged of huge

cheese and butter stocks. Less sensible but popular were the plunderings
of wine cellars. Long lines of raiders waited with buckets and containers
to get a chance at securing themselves free wine from the kegs or
expensive bottles in storage. 13 Since records of provisions were poorly
kept near the end of hostilities, it is difficult to estimate the extent of
the first massive plunderings. In any case, most large reserves were
pillaged until nearly empty. Much was simply destroyed under trampling
feet or in the fray.l4

Ilobermaier, and Mauerer 20.
12obermaier, and Mauerer 27.
13obermaier, and Mauerer 28.
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The looting grew more and more extreme. Injuries and deaths
increased as the stocks decreased. In the Lowenbriiukeller on May 3, two
people were crushed by stampeding feet.15 In the Arzbergerkeller on May
5, a woman was beaten to death by a fellow bottle-wielding plunderer.16
When bolder criminals realized the larger stocks were running out, they
began-- presumably in a miXture of desparation and confidence-- to hit
smaller shops and businesses. Many plunderers began arming
themselves, and attempts to stop them were few.1 7
Munich MG, the sudden sole protector of law and order, did not
act immediately against the looting. Extensive, and obvious plundering
continued at least 10 days after MG arrived18 and had begun to address
other pressing problems at once. It is difficult to establish firm reasons
for the delay, but some factors are clear. MG promptly announced the
earliest curfew on May 1,19 put many plunderers initially disobeyed u.20
Looters carried their goods openly through main streets, under the eyes
of idle MG officers. 21 US soldiers reportedly allowed much of the early

14obermaier, and Mauerer 38. Obermaier, and Mauerer (38)
presume that near the end of the war many depot keepers avoided precise
inventories because they themselves were skimming from the stocks.
15chronik 43.
16chronik 44.
17obermaier, and Mauerer 31.
18obermaier, and Mauerer 37.
19chronik 43.
20obermaier, and Mauerer 27.
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looting to run their course; they stood by watching the spectacle and
regarded the pillaging throngs favorably.22
Although looting by American soldiers was not universal, there was
a great deal of it. Many Gls reckoned that after the horrors and
hardships they had endured they deserved their plunder.23 From the
sources at hand it appears that plundering by Gls was less prevalent in
Munich than in areas with less scrupulous or effective MG detachments.
Still, American authorities of all sorts looted in all areas. The practice
quickly became an orchestrated art form:24
Soldiers stationed themselves outside militacy government offices
and intercepted civilians bringing in weapons. Tactical units
posted their own contraband lists in which they included items as
various as automobiles and jewelcy, and the militacy government
detachments acquired a new and, for the most part, unwelcome
function as tactical commands and individual high-ranking
officers requisitioned items of doubtful militacy usefulness through
them.
Munich MG assistant chief Keller was concerned about the
plundering from the start, yet optimistic about stopping it. On May 1 he
discussed with Cardinal Faulhaber the possibility of setting up a "mouse
trap" for the plunderers; Keller planned to steer the plunderers away from
the city by having ten train cars with wine, cheese, and other provisions
waiting for them at the Ostbahnhof. 25 It is not certain whether this

21wagner 151.
22obermaier, and Mauerer 28.
23ztemke, Army 136.
24ziemke, Army 250-251.
25obermaier, and Mauerer 150.
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action was attempted. In any case, it was at that point an already futile
maneuver.
Munich MG did finally take a clear, demonstrative stand against
the plundering. By May 18 MG had set up special raiding squads to
constantly patrol and combat plundertng.26 MG assured the public that
it would end all looting, and that plunderers would be punished sternly.
MG guaranteed those small businessmen who were allowed to reopen
that they could do so without having to fear looters.27 MG for Bavaria
announced that all plundered goods were to be immediately collected and
returned, and pledged the security of intact storehouses and supplies.
MG ordered the establishment of the "Landesamtjiir Erniihrung und
Landwirtschajt" (Land Office for Nutrition and Agriculture) to administer

all remaining stocks --one of the first offices formed on the Land levei.28
In the first months, US military courts determined punishment for
the plunderers and other lawbreakers. Occupation directives had ordered
the immediate closure of all courts: "extraordinary" courts and tribunals
of the Nazi party as well as all ordinary criminal, civil and administrative

26BayHStA OMGB(Y)l0/85-3/5, Weekly MG Munich, May 13-20,
1945: "In conjunction with the civilian police, an American riot squad ..
. . is operating efficiently in the suppression of riots, looting, black
marked activities and petty crime;" Bay. Landeszeitung, May 18, 1945, 1;
Chronik 51. Accordiing to Obermaier, and Mauerer (47), these teams of
military police usually took along a local German policeman; this
conferred some integrity to the German police who would later be on
their own.
27Bay. Landeszeitung, May 18, 1945, 1.
28Bay. Landeszeitung, June 1, 1945, 2.

90

courts.29 By October 1945 MG developed a plan for the establishment of
German courts. Under strict MG supervision the German courts
gradually began to take on "milder" cases, and cases involving Germans
breaking German laws.30 The Allies abolished all German criminal laws
originating in the Third Reich, and reestablished those in effect until
1924.31 This created two systems of justice in the first years of the
occupation·, in which political cases and those involving the pillaging of
US militruy property remained the domain of military courts. 32
US occupation courts were responsible for criminal and civil
matters, but criminal cases played a much greater role. MG criminal
courts decided cases punishable by both American and applicable
German laws.33 Foreigners and DPs breaking German laws were tried by

29From JCS 1067 in Holborn 162. Apart from Nazi courts there
were hardly any functioning courts by the end of the war (Robert M. W.
Kempner, "Amerikanische Militargerichte in Deutschland," Die Freiheit
des Anderen, [Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1981] 146).
30suddeutsche, Nov. 6, 1945, 3.
31 Miinchner, Aug. 11, 1945, 3. On German criminal law and Allied
policy, see: Hans Theodor Schmidt, "Das Strafrecht in Deutschland nach
der Kapitulation," Deutschland Archiv, 4 (1971): 43-47; Karl
Loewenstein, "Justice," Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1953) 236-262.
32Kempner 146. By 1946 the number of cases handled by American
courts fell to 27.5%, by 1947 15.9% (146).
33Kempner 146. Military Court procedures were unique for German
defendants. In contrast to German law, the Anglo-American legal
principles of "innocent until proven guilty" and Habeas Corpus were
acknowledged (146).
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the MG courts. MG judges had the power to hand out the death
sentence. 34
The courts were busy. By August 11, 1945, MG courts had tried
15,000 cases since the occupation began.35 During the week of August 915, 1945, for example, MG courts in Munich decided 193 cases. Most of
these involved black market dealings, illegal possession of US Army
goods, and false entries in the denazification questionnaires
(Fragebogen).36 In Munich, MG summary courts handling the lesser
cases-- breaking curfew, trespassing, for instance-- were trying 70 cases
daily in November 1945, and had already sentenced 4,000 people.37
A series of MG proclamations warned potential lawbreakers. MG
measures were designed not only to impede the possibility of disorder,
but also to assure the population that the situation was firmly under
MG control. Weapons or munitions in the hands of civilians, of any
nationality, were strictly forbidden and severely punished. Civilians with
knowledge of such items were to immediately report to MG posts or
Munich police stations.38 This policy was soon modified. As punishment
MG proclaimed the possibility of a death sentence, but at the same time
an amnesty period went into effect: anyone handing over munitions

34-suddeutsche, Nov. 27, 1945, 3.
35Munchner, Aug. 11, 1945, 4.
36Munchner, Sept. 1, 1945, 2.
37suddeutsche, Nov. 27, 1945, 3.
38Miinchner, June 9, 1945, 2.
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between July 9 and July 15 was free from punishment.39 The Miinchner
Zeitung demonstrated MG decisiveness by disclosing the fate of
lawbreakers such as Georg Fehlmer from Laufen: the highest military
court in Munich sentenced Herm Fehlmer to 15 years in prison for the
illegal possession of fire arms and munitions. Fehlmer had been
hoarding the material, then burying or hiding it near his home.40
From the day the occupation began the theft of US militacy
property was an issue. Daily MG received reports of civilians caught
stealing militacy goods. MG warned that anyone in possession of Allied
property would be harshly punished. MG did not acknowledge the
common excuse that it was not clear to the new owner that the stolen
articles were Allied property; nor did MG recognize the excuse that the
property was not under guard and therefore assumed to be "at hand."41
On May 17, two Miinchner were sentenced to two years in prison for
stealing tools belonging to the US Army. 42 MG considered the situation
severe enough that in Januacy 1946 it secured the authority to employ
and arm German guards to protect militaty installations as well as
targets "merely of importance to the civilian economy. n43

39Munchner, July 14, 1945, 2.
4~unchner, July 14, 1945, 2 ..

41Bay. Landeszeitung, June 1, 1945, 2.
42Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2
43BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 8. This directive of
Jan. 14·, 1946 (BayHStA OMGB[Y] 9/18-1 I 4) was valid for the whole US
Zone. The guards were to be "selected, employed, trained, supervised,
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MG established a form of martial law that allowed US and USsponsored authorities almost unlimited powers. In the chaos of the first
months, however, even MG hegemony could be exploited, and the
confusion of citizens manipulated. The massive movements of desperate,
needy people in this period lent itself to many criminal schemes, and
continued for quite some time. In September of 1945, MG observed the
following ruse:44
Masquerading in parts of cast-offWehrmacht uniforms and
pretending to be discharged PW's returning from the Russian
occupied zone or simply posing as refugees haVing been mistreated
by Russian occupational troops, numerous beggars are making
their appearance in certain sections of Munich, especially in the
less destroyed Western suburbs and in the surrounding country.
They are taking advantage of the credulity of the populace in
general.
After the plundering became too risky, clever opportunists contrived
simple, effective, and more "refined" methods for seizing goods. Small
gangs of men, for instance, donned American uniforms, or uniforms
similar enough to deceive. They approached residences and brusquely
announced themselves, presumably, "on orders of Military Government,"
or members of an authorized "anti-Nazi organization," and proceeded to
search the home and "confiscate" whatever they wished.45 The
acknowledged respect for uniforms also led shrewd criminals to feign
disciplined and controlled by the head of the police force .... in
accordance with local policy ( 1 ). " In addition, MG was authorized to
license private detective agencies and guard services that passed
denazification directives. These men were not to be armed, not even with
batons (2).
44BayHStA OMGB(Y) CO I 445 I 1, Untitled MG Report (hereafter:
MG Report) for Sept. 28 to Oct. 4, 1945.
45obermaier, and Mauerer 4 7.
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themselves as German police. By July 1946 120 "phony" detectives had
been caught since the beginning of the year.46
Many "infringements" were customary for such a chaotic, desperate
atmosphere. Other circumstances were more vicious. In the war years of
1939-45 there were 100 registered violent deaths in all of Upper Bavaria
(Oberbayem). In Munich alone between May 1 and July 28, 1945,

however, roughly 421 people died a violent death-- 155 from murder or
beatings, 63 by suicide, and 120 from accidents.47 Among these deaths-registered to the Munich police-- 302 were men, 84 women, and 35
children. A further 83 persons were victims of SS or Wehrmacht military
courts, and 95 reported missing-- among these 28 children.48
In Bavaria as a whole, the most vicious crimes decreased after
roughly the first three months. Nevertheless, "lesser" crimes such as
robbery, looting, and common assault continued and even increased.49
The number of such crimes was already high: in the months of May and
June, for example, 6,048 burglaries and 1,334 robberies, muggings, and
lootings50 were reported to the largely helpless and understaffed Munich
police. MG Public Safety for Bavaria found that there had been an

46chronik 180.
47wagner 167.
48obermaier, and Mauerer 54.
49BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, Public Safety Branch Monthly
Report (hereafter PSBMR), Nov. 5, 1945, 1.
50obermaier, and Mauerer 54. It is important to bear in mind that
many lesser crimes were presumably never reported.
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increase of crimes committed by US Army personnel as well; crimes
extending from "the theft of bicycles and radios to rape and felonious
assault."51
The "lesser" crimes did not dissappear over time. In 1947 Public
Safety for Bavaria concluded that "arson, sex offences, narcotic offences,
black market, abortion, offences against Military Government laws,
fraud, theft, coinage crimes and stolen property" had all increased over
the year before. 52 Public Safety crime statistics reveal that the total
crimes committed in the year 1946-4 7 -- 410,225 -- were almost twice as
many as in the year 1945-46 -- 284,666.53
In the short term, Public Safety for Bavaria concluded (in Nov.
1945) that the main deterrent to the more violent crimes was the arming
of the local police: the number of incidents dropped in those areas where ·
police were armed. Furthermore, as local police gained greater mobility -by means of patrol cars, motorcycles, and so forth-- crimes also
decreased. 54 Munich MG's Public Safety also stressed the importance of
arms and equipment. Moreover, reports attributed many early problems
to "all sorts of vagabonds and generally unclassiflable persons" who

51BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 5,1945, 1. MG's
conclusion was based on reports from German government officials (1).
See also: Zink 137-138.
52BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, Public Safety Branch Cumulative
Annual History (hereafter PSBCAH), July 16, 1947, 7.
53
53BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBCAH, July 16, 1947,7.
54BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 5, 1945, 1.
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became reasonably assimilated by the end of the third month of
occupation.55

DISPLACED PERSONS AND CRIME

Much of the criminal disorder sprang from a somewhat unlikely
source. Among the unfortunate multitude of the so-called Displaced
Persons (DPs) were individuals accountable for many sorts of crime. 56
DP criminals included former forced laborers as well as former
concentration camp inmates. DP status was peculiar, and posed special
problems for MG as well as the German authorities.57
In 1944-45, the Allies invented the term "Displaced Persons" to
describe all those individuals who, because of Nazi persecution and labor
policies, were in a place they did not belong. These groups required and
deserved fun damen tal assistance from Allied authorities as victims of the
Nazi regime. 58

55BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 7-9.
56Another social group, youth, showed a marked, though not as
large part in crime activities as DPs in the post-war period. Youth crime
began to increase in 1946 (Chronik 146). On causes, see Barbara
Willenbacher, "Zerriittung und Bewahrung der Nachkriegs-Familie," Von
Stalingrad zur Wahrungreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in
Deutschland, Ed. Martin Brozsat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans ·
Woller, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988) 596-618.
57The DPs should not be confused with the refugees -- mostly
German nationals-- flooding into Germany during this period from the
east.
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The DPs constituted a definable group, but structurally they were
an "amorphous" one of individuals transferred and imprisoned against
their will. Within the category of DPs were two types: on the one hand
forced laborers and foreign workers; on the other liberated persecutees59
-- political prisoners, concentration camp victims, and so forth. One
relatively homogenous DP characteristic-- age-- was precisly due to the
fact that many DPs were forced laborers selected for youth and stability.
DPs constituted a rather solid age group instead of a normal mix of ages
between various sociallevels60 Precise, contemporary age figures for 1945
are nevertheless difficult to ascertain for DPs as a whole. Rough
estimates of Polish DPs suggest that there were more male than female
DPs; that the men were mostly between 15 and 35, and the women
between 25 and 39.61
The Allied Powers naturally assumed the enormous responsibility
of caring for and repatriating the DPs. Still, who exactly was in charge of
this reponsibility had to be clarified during 1945. According to the UN
charter of Nov. 9, 1943, the DPs were displaced nationals of the United
58wolfgang Jacobmeyer, "Die Displaced Persons," Fliichtlinge und
Vertriebene in der Westdeutschen Nachkrtegsgeshcichte: Bilanzierung der
Forschung und Perspektlven fiir die kiinftige Forschungsarbelt, Ed.
Rainer Schulze, Doris von der Brelie-LeWien, and Helga Grebing,
(Hildesheim: Lax, 1987) 175. In this piece Jacobmeyer indicates the lack
of research on the DP phenomenon. For consideration of Jewish DPs, see
Wetzel327-366.
59Jacobmeyer 175.
60Jacobmeyer 175-76.
61Jacobmeyer 176. Jacobmeyer (176) attributes the higher female
age to "rational'' Nazi criteria for forced labor: older female laborers were
less inclined to become pregnant.
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Nations.62 Accordingly, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA) was to care for DPs in Germany and attend to
their repatriation after the capitulation. Initially, however, UNRRA
personnel assisted the Allied armies in DP matters. UNRRA teams were
under the command of Allied Supreme Commander General Eisenhower,
and the US Army assumed supply responsibilities for DPs in Germany.63
Originally, MG personnel were only to care for and locate DPs
during the combat period. The administration of DP assembly centers in
the rear zones was to be gradually taken over by UNRRA personnel ready
for special assistance. Nevertheless, the surrender in May suddenly
liberated MG administrative staff as well as Allied transport and care
capacity for DP matters.64 At the time of the surrender there were an
estimated 5,800,000 DPs in the occupation areas as a whole. 3,260,000
of these were repatriated by July 2, 1945.65 In summer and fa111945 a
daily rate of 33,000 DPs were transported to their homes. By 1946
repatriation slowed down tremendously, and for the whole year reached
only about 500,000 DPs.66 In the American Zone itself, the total number

62Holborn 13.
63Holborn 13. The three volume UNRRA histo:ry gives only scant
mention of UNRRA and the DP issue within Germany: UNRRA: The
History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration,
Ed. George Woodbridge, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1950).
64Holbom 48.
65Munchner, July 14, 1945, 1.
66Jacobmeyer 177.
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ofDPs in UNRRA assembly centers in May 1946 was down to 348,000 -163,000 Poles, 87,000 Balkans, 43,000 Jews and 55,000 of various
origm.67
The German-American historian Hajo Holborn gives MG credit for
solving much of the early DP repatriation problem. Since events
developed vecy quickly after May, the UNRRA teams became a factor in
DP matters much later than planned.68 How soon the DPs would be
turned over to the civilian UNRRA authorities was left up to the
individual MG commanders in the field. In the confusing period at the
end of hostilities, when MG found itself responsible for many challenging
tasks at once, this meant that the turnover of DPs to UNRRA varied
greatly.69
In May 1945 Munich MG staff and tactical army DP teams had full
responsibility for DP care and repatriation. At that time there were than
300 camps or "concentrations" of DPs in the Munich area. Four of the
largest camps consisted of 7,000; 6,500; 4,000; and 1,000 respectively. It
is difficult to establish the exact number of DPs at a given time, since
repatriation proceeded at such a rapid rate during this time.
Nevertheless, MG estimated the total amount of DPs to be about
65,000.70 The following list from MG reports details the various
nationalities of the DP as of May 26, 1945:71

67wetzel 346.
68Holborn 48.
69Holborn 13.
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Russians
Poles
French
Belgians
Dutch·
Yugo-Slavians
Czechs
Greeks
Jews (all nations)
All Others
In hospitals

25,183
8,391
9,242
1,841
1,564
1,392
1,339
917
1,762
2,585
714

Total:

55,930

MG estimated evacuations by the same date as follows: 72
Russians
Poles
Czechs
French, Belgian and Dutch

1,147
2,322
206
17,898

Total:

21,573

As the numbers illustrate, most of the DPs from Western European
countries were readily repatriated in the first months. Russian DPs,
although numerous, were promptly transported home as well. Already by
the middle of June, MG reported an insufficient number of Russian DPs
to complete the "rail quota" of 2,000 persons. In the last week of June,
however, there was an "unprecedented influx" of Russians from other
sites in the American Zone that "taxed DP camp facilities to the limit."
Still, this was temporacy, as Munich was a necessacy railhead: in one
telling example more than 30,000 Russians were sent on within 24 hours
70BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 149.
71BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 150.
72BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 150.
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after their arrival. 73 By July the number of DP camps had been reduced
to 200.74 By Sept. 1945 the DP population totalled 29,389.75
The job of caring for the DPs put a great burden on MG. Principal
difficulties were locating housing and providing food. MG attempted to
assemble DPs in the largest concentrations possible to simplify
administration, attain more effective security, and to assure economy in
food distribution. 76
Continuous reorganization in 1945 caused shifts and a lack of
clarity in responsibility for the DPs. The regular US Army relieved the
Munich MG detachment of some DP responsibilites by the end of July.77
After October 1945 UNRRA took over the administration and care for the
DP camps. 78 Complete termination of MG responsibility for DP matters
was made official on December 31, 1945. Nevertheless, Munich MG felt it
necessary, "temporarily at least," to maintain a DP bureau, since the
Munich Rathaus where MG was headquartered was "an obvious focal

73BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 153.
74Munchner, July 7, 1945, 2.
75BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 153.
76BayHStAOMGB(Y} 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 150.
77BayHStA OMGB(Y},10/78-l /4, Munich AHR 153. On the regular
army's role in DP matters, see: Ziemke, Army 284-290.
78wetzel 346. In Munich UNRRA established a headquarters for
the complete US Zone, and in the Deutsches Museum a university for DPs
(346}.
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point" which DP's sought out for advice, assistance, and information. 79
A visiting MG observer lamented in December 1945 the lack of
"centralized control" between the various branches and agencies
responsible for DP affairs, a tense situation that was straining the efforts
of MG detachment staff burdened with an increased work load despite
fewer personnel. 80
Allied leaders had hoped to resolve problems of DP care and
repatriation by September of 1945.81 The UNRRA and MG personnel
managing DP matters were soon faced with problems of a different and
more complex nature, however. Many DPs viewed the regimented
"administration" of their lives and their condition -- despite the clear
advantages in comparison to life in the Third Reich -- as continuation of
their former persecution and severe existence.82 Some DPs remaining
after the first couple of months did not want to comply with
repatriation, 83 and avoided returning to their former homes. Polish DPs
posed a special challenge in this respect. Of these former civilian forced
laborers and soldiers, more than 500,000 remained in the British and
American Zones as of the end of August. Many refused to be repatriated,
and held out for transport to other destinations and new homes.84
79BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/3, MG Monthly for January, 1946,
29.
80BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 5-6.
81Munchner, July 14, 1945, 1.
82Jacobmeyer 178.
83Holborn 48.
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Inside the camps some DP groups began to defiantly organize themselves
both politically and militarily, forcing US occupation forces to take
drastic actions. 85
The greatest dilemma for occupation and German authorities was
the DPs' involvement in crime. Not all, or even most of the DPs were
criminal. It is nevertheless a fact that in Munich and throughout the US
Zone DPs played a significant role in criminal activities. 86 It is
impossible to establish the exact impetus for DP criminality, but many
motives can be presumed: hate, fear, revenge, hunger-- all stemming for
years of deprivation and brutality; the frustrating idleness of the DP
camps; in addition perhaps an expectation among some -- consciously or
not -- that they would be able to utilize their liberated status for
unworthy ends.
Among the DPs remaining after the first few months of
repatriations were many doubtful characters. In a telling example, MG in
nearby Regensburg had 240 DPs complete a questionnaire similar to the
Fragebogen required of Germans. Results revealed that 40 percent of

84Miinchner, Sept. 1, 1945, 3. This Polish problem was significant
enough that General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomecy felt it
necessacy to hold talks on it at the end of Aug. 1945 (3).
85For example: In Munich on Februacy 14, 1946, heaVily armed US
tactical troops raided specific camps for Polish and YugoslaVian DPs. The
units seized numerous documents and weapons, and in the YugoslaVian
camp found that many DPs bore identification cards for the "Royal
YugoslaVian Army of Bavaria" (Chronik 141).
86For general consideration of the DPs and crime, see: Ziemke,
Army 354-358.
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those questioned, if German, would have been deemed "unemployable in
responsible positions and possibly subject to arrest. "87
MG reports are filled With obseiVations on lawless DPs. MG for
Munich summarized the issue with the following passage:88 "The
greatest problem in the early days [of the occupation] was the vast
number ofDP's [sic], newly liberated persecutees, and criminals who had
been indiscriminately released along With the political persecu tees, all of
whom roamed the land and ravaged the towns."
German officials came to the same conclusions. The criminal
investigations branch of the Munich police recorded the following crimes
for the period of May until Nov. 1945, and the percentage committed by
foreign nationals:89
Crime
Murder
Robbecy
Plundering
Black Market

Total
422

1,617
834
1,019

Percentage Committed
by Foreigners
75%
80%
70%
75%

Figures for 1946 reveal that the percentage of foreigners committing the
most vicious crimes (murder, robbecy, extortion) remained over 70%,90
despite the diminishing number of DPs.
DPs were responsible for many of the early, more vicious crimes,
and were at the "vanguard" during the early plundering. Prominent
87ziemke, Army 356.
88BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 5.
89wacker 55. It is unfortunate that these crime figures do not
clarify which sort of the various DPs were most criminally active.
90wacker 55.
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among criminal DPs were the Poles. In Nov. 1945, MG's Public Safety
Branch for Bavaria explained the crimes of the previous month in the
following terms: "The bulk of [the] crimes were attributed to Displaced
Persons [sic}, particularly Poles and Hungarians .... the incidence was
heaviest in areas adjacent to Displaced Persons camps.91
DPs remained criminally active for a long time. By Februazy 1946
MG judgment of DP activity was much the same, in spite of repatriation
efforts:92
The looting and plundering reports attributed much of such
activities to Displaced Persons. Information received indicated that
the bulk of the persons, so engaged, have either refused to return
to their native land or have been repatriated and have returned.
Already by Sept. 1945, Munich MG had reached the following
conclusion:93
DP's remained the major offenders in all crimes, 46% of all arrests
made in the last week were established as DP's and it is estimated
that 90% of all major crimes were committed by them.
In explaining a rising rate of crime incidences in 1946, Munich MG
maintained that criminality was "largely due to the activities of DP's and
other foreigners lodged in camps and lagers [sic]."94 In clarifying the
main offenders, MG contended that ••the Poles continued to constitute
the largest class of DP offenders."95

91BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 5, 1945, 1.
92BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Feb. 8, 1946,2.
93BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 49.
94BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 9.
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Control of DP criminality was complicated by special problems. The
use of American uniforms or similar dress allowed criminals to easily and
often exploit the almost unlimited power of US occupation forces. In
October 1945, MG and the German police found themselves constantly
occupied with the following sort of situation: "DP's dressed in American
uniform, continued their daily terror prowls, robbing and looting. One
gang was broken up, the ring leader in jail, and an intensive
investigation was made by the MP's and German Police. "96 It is not
clear in all cases if MG or army personnel -- presumably when they
staffed DP camps-- originally provided the uniforms.
In any event, MG was concerned about the uniforms for another
reason: reports of many crimes by DPs in American uniform were charged
to the US troops. 97 Such circumstances certainly did not lend
themselves to a greater trust of MG among the local population. By
November Munich MG began an "aggressive campaign" to limit
unauthorized persons from wearing US uniforms, and found the measure
effective. 98
To some degree the occupiers' experiments in security invited such
consequences. A common practice was employing DPs as guards,
especially Poles. In Munich, the units appear to have been much too

95BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10178-114, Munich AHR, 52 .
. 96BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10178-114, Munich AHR 50.
97BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 78-l I 4, Munich AHR 49.
98BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 78-l I 4, Munich AHR 51: "Offenders were
stripped of the uniform and received jail sentences."
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eager for MG standards: "A high degree of violence is exhibited by Poles
employed by the US Army as guards."99 In January 1946, the Polish
guards remained the "most troublesome group." They were still in
American uniform, by then modified by only a small shoulder patch.1 00
Significantly, even by March 1946 the problem had not been rectified:101
The principal obstacle to efficient policing continued to be the
Polish units wearing American uniforms. Until this situation is
corrected confusion will exist as certain of these persons misuse
the immunity of the uniform for their criminal purposes.
Despite stricter MG measures, DP criminality was a problem that
would not go away. In Bavaria between June 1 and October 30, MG
courts (solely responsible for prosecuting DPs) held 2, 700 trials for
serious crimes such as murder, robbecy and looting.1 02 MG courts
pronounced harsh sentences. In December 1945, for example, the highest
US military court in Munich sentenced two Greeks to death. On July 11
. they had intentionally strangled a 62-year-old Munich woman and
pillaged her apartment.l03 By November 1945, Public Safety for Bavaria
felt the problems significant enought to receive authorization to use US
Army personnel as armed guards at specific DP camps, especially in areas
where crimes of looting, rape and murdering were widespread.! 04 In the

99BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 9.
lOOBayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 51.
101BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 52.
102ztemke, Army 358.
103suddeutsche, December 7, 1945, 3.

108
same period, Munich MG assessed the DP situation in a familiar manner
but offered an insightful View: 105
Forty-two percent of the crime in Munich is caused by nonGermans, who constitute less than 5% of the total population.
Gangs of Frenchmen have been involved in the forging of food
requisitions. Poles have been going to Poland, selling clothing
issued here, and returning to Munich with huge sums in marks,
and the hope of obtaining a new clothing hand-out. It has been
recommended to higher authority, in View of the above reported
incidents, that the non-Germans privilege of trial only by Militacy
Government courts be withdrawn, or the policy of developing
German responsibility for self-government will be undermined.
The above recommendation remained a recommendation.
DP criminals were a defiant and especially violent group. This
factor made their arrest much more difficult, especially for German police
who were relatively impotent in DP matters. Despite MG regulations, DPs
were often armed and did not willingly yield to arrest. Because of this,
MG assessed that the already high amount of crime reported did not
reflect the "true picture" of crime. 106
It is significant that not all former concentration camp inmates

were law-abiding. Some DPs who were former prisoners of concentration
camps -- although themselves victims of vicious brutality -- took part in
robberies, plundering, and the black market. Many of these types took it
upon themselves to exploit MG power and the helplessness of the
occupied by illegally seizing goods and occupying housing. Some of the
alleged victims had not been in concentration camps at at all; some were
104sayHStA OMGB(Y) 10165-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 29, 1945,2.
I 05sayHStA OMGB(Y} I 0 I 78-l I 3, MG Monthly for November
1945, 5.
106sayHStA OMGB(Y) I0178-1 14, Munich AHR 51.
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common criminals and murderers who were liberated along With the Jews
and political prisoners. Others had served in the camps as henchmen ·
and "agent provocateurs" for the ss.1 07
There was confusion and fear among the local population
concerning which DPs had been politically persecuted, who of these were
authorized by MG, and how effectively DPs were being controlled. The
tense situation led to new measures. By September MG ordered the
preparation of official identification cards for former concentration camp
inmates that distinguished those who had been truly persecuted on
political grounds from those criminal elements exploiting former camp
inmate legitimacy.108 At the same time, MG used its media to warn the
public of "Two Types of Camp Inmates" ("Zwei Arten von KZ'Lern")l 09 and
clarified who was to be trusted in strict occupation matters and
measures.
Persistent pessimistic gossip clouded clear impressions of actual
success in regulating concentration camp inmates. Rumors ran rampant
among local Germans in November that MG would tolerate former forced
laborers and concentration camp inmates unleashing a wave of
plundering and looting around November 8 and 9, on the anniversary of
the 1938

~'Krystallnacht"

(Ccystal Night). The rumors were without

107Munchner, Sept. 8, 1945, 4.
108chronik, 84; Miinchner, Sept. 8, 1945, 4.
109Munchner, Sept. 8, 1945, 4.
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foundation, yet MG, the German police, and a group of former camp
inmates all clarified publicly they would not permit such activities. 110
Many of the crime problems in the early occupation were direct
products of brutal strife. Hideous strains on human dignity, morals and
willpower ensued from the unforgiving devastation and utter breakdown
of administration and infrastructure . The melee of crimes expressed
hate, revenge, naked fear and cold opportunism. Under the
circumstances, it could easily be argued, MG performed an admirable job
in holding the possibility for crimes in check. Still, as the example of the
looting situation in Munich reveals, MG appeared to act selectively early
on in curbing certain threats to law and order.
Tentative, unclear policy led to the DPs' ill-defined status and
confused control. Many DPs, once victims themselves, fended for
themselves or were assembled in camps at least symbolically similar to
ones in which they languished for years. For many DPs the pain and
want continued unabated after liberation, matched only by their
newfound capacity to lash out and practice blunt malevolence at a
savage world. Such ferocity of temper created major challenges for
occupation authorities and near hopelessness for restrained German
police officials.

110BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 29, 1945, 1;
Chronik 98.

CHAPTER VI

LAW AND ORDER ISSUES II: THE BLACK MARKET

In the early post-war black market, significant elements thus far
described in this study were present: MG's commanding role; uncertain
German police authority; the effect of the plundering; crime and the DPs.
The black market was a peculiar type of crime. The black market
was an ironic "institution" that began to expand during the war and
easily survived Nazi measures to tame it. Black marketeers mocked their
persecutors and persisted to thrive into the chaotic early occupation and
on. One could argue whether or not, under the circumstances, black
market dealing was really a "crime" at all. Black marketing permeated all
sectors of a bitterly ravaged society and involved Germans and Gis, MG
officers and DPs alike. For many common, normally law-abiding citizens,
the black market was the only way to survive.
Black trading was a significant and threatening problem
nevertheless. Unofficial trading interfered with official efforts to create an
economic base and provide necessary levels of nutrition. Many black
marketeers were heartless opportunists, some cruel and violent
criminals.
Efforts to curb the black market were mostly ineffectual or naively
deemed successful. In combating the Munich black market, MG at first
assumed the usual imposing role, but soon left most direct engagement

112
up to the German police. Did MG not recognize the intensity of the black
market, or did it ignore the German police's inability to confront it?
Perhaps MG did not consider itself ultimately responsible for the
problem? The best explanation for this enigmatic issue appears to involve
a combination of all these considerations, and more.

THE NATURE OF THE BLACK MARKET

To a great extent the black market resulted from the lack of
sufficient provisions and goods, and did not begin at the capitulation.
Throughout the Second World War there had existed in Europe a robust
and consistent "shadow economy." In many cases the goal of this form of
black marketeering was to evade Nazi economic controls
(Zwangsbewirtschajtung) by circumventing rations restrictions. SS

security officials described three rough criminal classifications of the
wartime shadow economy: bartering (Tauschhandel); illicit trading
(Schleichhandel); and black marketeering (Schwarzhandel) .1

Stern measures did not impede the growth of the black market
inside the boundaries of the Third Reich. Stricter wartime controls only
led to consistently rising economic "crimes." From 1939 to mid-1 943,
59,253 violators were sentenced in the areas of the German Reich. The
offences violated the War Economy Decree (Kriegswirtschajtsverordnung)
of September 4, 1939, and the Consumption Control Criminal Ordinance
(Verbrauchsregelungsstrajverordnung) of April 6, 1940. The number of

1Boelke, Willi, Der Schwarzmarkt 1945-48: Vom Uberleben nach
dem Kriege (Braunschweig: Westermann, 1986) 11-13.

113
offences jumped markedly after 1941; only 2,946 of the above cases were
committed in 1939-40.2
In the last years of the war, the shadow economy grew even more.
Many of the simplest but necessacy household items could only be found
on the black. market. The undeniable shadow economy led to the gradual
legalization of lesser violations. Later Nazi economic decrees
acknowledged the existence of a black market and toned down
punishment for minor violations. 3 Guidelines for combatting bartering
and illicit trading from August and December 1944 ignored the
"Letztverbraucher" -- the ordinacy participant on the edges of the shadow

economy-- as long he bought or traded for personal usage and "in
modest amounts." Interestingly, the same decrees allowed foreign forced
laborers -- the later DPs -- to trade inside their camps.4
Despite the wartime growth of the black market, it is significant
that, even under rationing, the levels of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and
nutritrional standards had been largely assured. Significant amounts of
goods arrived from the occupied lands to fill gaps. Increased bombings
near the end of 1944 caused rationing to become more pronounced, yet
the nutritional level for the "normal adult consumer" of 2,000 calories
per day was still maintained.5

2Boelke 16.
3Boelke 21.
4Boelke 28.
5Fuchs, Margot, "'Zucker, wer hat? 01, wer kauft?' Ernahrungslage
und Schwarzmarkt in Miinchen 1945-49," Triimmerleben. Texte.
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Unconditional surrender suddenly destroyed the ability to provide
an adequate standard of goods and provisions. Chaos and destruction
brought about the complete breakdown of the nutritional and supply
infrastructure. The division of German areas, the loss of eastern lands
and the devastation of the transport network compounded problems. The
sudden lack of forced laborers in the agrarian economy posed another
challenge.6 Plundering also took a great toll. In Munich, for instance,
the pillaging of the first days emptied almost completely the provision
stocks for the city. These supplies were intended to cover the population
for several weeks. 7
In matters regarding food supply, MG assumed a supervisory role
from the beginning and appointed Germans to administer the situation.
MG's response to the food emergency illustrates the early reliance on
capable and effective figures. Munich MG immediately-- on May 5, 1945,
days before MG controlled the widespread plundering-- appointed Dr.
Ernst Rattenhuber to head the Landesamtfiir Ernahrung und
Landwirtschajt (the Land Office for Nutrition and Agriculture). Like other

early Munich appointees, Rattenhuber was made responsible for
conditions in all of Bavaria. MG tnade it clear to Rattenhuber he was
only a temporary "tool" (Werkzeug); MG pressured him to devise an

Dokumente, Bilder aus den Miinchner Nachkriegsjahren, Ed. Friedrich
Prinz and Marita Krauss, (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985)
103. The 2000 calorie standard was not met again until 1950-51 (103).
6Fuchs 103.
7Fuchs 105.
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immediate solution to the food shortages. Rattenhuber was threatened
with a war crimes indictment if he could not fulfill his task. 8
Rattenhuber's assignment was daunting.9 Rattenhuber's office was
to administer all the remaining stocks of goods and provisions. The office
formulated a new rationing system which at first remained the same as
before the surrender: Bavarians continued to use wartime ration cards
(including the swastika printed on them) and obey the established
distribution periods. Thereafter a monthly ration rate -- according to
user categocy -- was set by the Wirtschajtsrat (Economic Council)
su petvised by the Allies in Frankfurt. I 0
The Wirtschajtrat's assigned goal of 2,600 calories for the average
adult consumer was never reached in Munich. At the end of December,
1945, the average was only 1,500 calories.ll Thus the nutritional and
survival possiblities offered by the black market made it essential to
many. The following examples are illustrative. In 1946, a common
Munich pensioner recieved 45 marks a month. From this amount, he
could purchase with a legal ration card whatever food was available for

8Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht," 177. Rattenhuber, a private
land owner and monarchist, had administered the crown estates of the
Bavarian princes. He had in1pressed MG by taking the initiative
immediately before the occupation in attempting to secure the dai:ry
supply in his own community ( 177 -78).
9As it turned out, the politically problematic Rattenhuber -- he
had Nazi as well as monarchist connections -- did not last in his post
because of the intensified MG denazification process.
1~uchs 104.

11Fuchs 104.
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15 marks. Typical rent was 30 marks. His money now gone, he could not
buy heating material legally or on the black market. A skilled worker with
two children earned 200 marks a month. That amount covered dinner for
one in a decent restaurant.12 In such an environment there were two
realities, and two economies-- the legal and the black.
Of course, the reasons for the black market were not simply
nutritional. Any sort of trading outside the normal market, supply, and
price structure was black market trading, and the ultimate effects of this
total unofficial market were not positive. Illegal commerce did not
necessarily help ease conditions. The buying and selling of items outside
the rationing structure, for example, hindered supply efforts in the long
run and undermined the price structure.13
Many black marketeers were obviously not hying to survive, or help ·
people survive, but to prosper. Many of the criminals and plunderers
discussed previously found the market a logical outlet, and the preferred
arena. Accordingly, black market sources were manifold. German
historian Willi Boelke has ascertained that the post-war black market
derived merchandise from the following nine general sources:l4 1)
supplies -- especially food and luxury items-- of the occupation forces;
2) foreign products smuggled in; 3) assets of consumer goods and

12chronik 212.
13Fuchs 112.
14Boelke 138 (translated by this author). The numerical sequence
does not correspond to a quantative order; such a listing would be
conjecture at best.
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valuables from the German population; 4) routinely produced industrial
and commercial goods; 5) normal agricultural production, surpluses, and
unfulfilled delivecy quotas; 6) embezzled or squandered goods as well as
leftover inventories from regular trade and commerce; 7) cached rations,
bartered produce, and material assets; 8) belongings and provisions
obtained by robbecy, theft, plundering and fraud; and 9) wares procured
by counterfeiting (from falsified ration cards, for example). Black trade
was "big business." At the end of 1946 roughly 30% of industrial
production -- not including heavy industcy -- entered the black market
directly .15
Despite the severe consequences for possessing, selling, or trading
US militacy property, the black market thrived from the availability of US
goods. In September 1945, General Eisenhower found the situation
extreme enough to fortify measures against the "dangerous" and growing
trade in US goods, both for foreigners and German citizens. All civilians
had to prove their rightful ownership of US property, and were threatened
with the harshest punishment.16
Many goods could simply not have reached the black market
without the participation of the occupier. US soldiers as well as higher
officers abused their powerful status17 and played a substantial role in

15Fuchs 113.
16Munchner, Sept. 22, 1945.
17see: Davis 148-161. For depiction of an exceptionally corrupt-politically and criminally-- MG detachment commander who went largely
undiscovered, see the example of Eichsta.tt's Maj. Towle in Peterson 306314.
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the black market, utilizing their impunity from the German police and
creating the widespread availability of US goods and vehicles. Faced with
dull occupation routine, Gls and officers found the black market was the
only real game to play; "virtually evecy occupation soldier was faced with
the maximum of opportunity and the maximum oftemptation."18
Although most Americans denied it, black marketing was so widespread
on a small scale that those who did not practice it were viewed as
"peculiar' or 'freaks."' 19 Far less prevalent but a problem nevertheless
were major black market rings involving higher ranking officers and G Is
alike.20 The bribecy of US personnel was also widespread, and some
German employees of MG exploited their influence in return for certain
favors.21 The endless cases reported in MG media served as a warning,22
but also hint at all the corruption that was never discovered.
Considerable US militacy involvement in the black market
continued until the currency reform of 1948 despite continual
measures,23 and had at times a critical impact on occupation operations

18Davis 149.
19zink 138.
20zink 139.
21various examples in Siiddeutsche, Oct. 23, 1945, 4.
22For example, the case of Hans Klein: Klein was found guilty of
attempting -- with the help of a German ·employee of MG -- to bribe a US
militacy criminal court officer into freeing his father, a restaurant owner
arrested for the illegal posession of large stocks of US cigarettes and
provisions stored in his restaurant (Siiddeutsche, Oct. 12, 1945, 3).
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and finances. Occupation chroniclers such as Harold Zink maintain that
the Americans' widespread black marketing had an even greater impact
on the occupation than simply economic or operational factors.24 Many
Germans became far less impressed with their occupiers' abilities, lofty
aims and strict measures when they witnessed daily the widespread
duplicity the Americans practiced by enjoying the sour fruits of the black
market.
Resolute black marketeers repeatedly adapted themselves to market
conditions. Directly after the capitulation, money-- reichsmarks,
militaty currency, and dollars-- played a major role on the black market.
Money changing paid off, and goods brought enormous profits; prices
were well over those in normal conditions. The amounts fluctuated
greatly according to supply and demand.25 By the end of August 1945
money was losing significance, however, and the cigarette was fast
becoming the prime currency as well as the preferred product.26
American cigarettes were highest in demand. Coffee also held steady
worth.27 As in the Third Reich shadow economy, many items and
services were simply bartered. The intrinsically unregulated and fluid

23Davis ·151-161; Boelke 127-129. US soldiers found guilty of black
market dealings could be immediately sent home (129) --perhaps
another reason why so many were involved!
24Davis 138.
25Fuchs 113.
26By the middle of August evety citizen of both sexes over 18 years
of age received a regular ration of 20 cigarettes (Chronik 69).
·
27obermaier, and Maurer 72.
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nature of the black market made it extremely difficult to control or
impede.

CONFRONTING THE MUNICH BLACK MARKET

In Munich the already existing black market continued almost
without pause after the capitulation at various sites. The Gestapo had
indifferently monitored a black market among foreign forced labor in and
around hospital facilities at the north end of the Sendlinger Tor-Platz.
During May 1945, without police controls and little possibility of arrest,
this area developed into a major black market center.28 Other black
market areas suddenly emerged, including the Hauptbahnhqf (main train
station). Pubs, restaurants and hotels began to attract black traders as
well, especially in inclement weather.29
At first the black marketeers appeared freely in the open. It is
impossible to determine the degree to which the unchecked plundering
contributed to the black marketeers' sudden confidence, but a
connection is presumed. Moreover: the circumstance that many black
marketeers were DPs who suddenly found themselves liberated and
considered themselves relatively free from (especially German) control
offers an explanation for the unexpected casualness. Another factor is
that MG was only beginning to establish its authority in May.

28obennaier, and Maurer, 46.
29Fuchs 115.
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In any case, the relative confusion afforded black traders much
latitude. German laws regulating the black market remained in effect but
appear to have held little actual sway over lawbreakers. In June 1945,
the desolate Munich criminal police observed defiant black marketeers
setting up umbrellas, laying out their wares, and conducting games of
~hance offering huge money ptizes of bundled reichsmarks.30

Not until June did MG or German authorities seriously attempt to
address the situation. US personnel participated directly early on. They
remained available for assistance if necessaty, yet in combatting the
black market MG soon took on an "advisoty" role. Although issues
remained which MG influenced directly, it soon left the routine control
of the black market largely up to the police and the municipal
authorities.
Concerted efforts to combat the black market began in July 1945.
MG determined that black market operators were indeed violating
German criminal laws, and German police surveyed the extent,
locations, sources and possible legal violations (both US and German) of
black market activities. 31 Combined units (named "flying squads" by
MG) of German and military police repeatedly raided black market areas.
Munich's famous Viktualienmarkt, the site of a thriving black market, was
raided hourly or

m~re,

so that soon MG could report "negative" black

market activity. 32 The first black market case-- illegal possession of

3DFuchs 113.
31BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 46.
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rationed German meat-- resulted in a guilty sentence and punishment
of 1 year imprisonment including hard labor.33 By the end of July, 121
persons had been arrested for black market crimes, and 162
interrogated. 34
The apparent mastecy of the situation continued. In August MG
attributed success in fighting the black market to the following
measures: "The dispersing of large gatherings .... the circulation of
criminal police in civilian clothes wherever people gather . . . . the
presence of cruising motorcycle patrols .... [and] the use of placards
and a sound truck as warning device."35 Twelve squads of German police
were patrolling during the day and an MG sound truck roamed the
streets announcing warnings against black market activity. 36
According to the its own reports Munich MG considered these
efforts highly successsful. Already in mid-August reports claimed that
"the backbone of the Black Market [sic] was broken," and attributed
further success to the decrease in DPs, "offering proof that these people
are the main violators of Price and Food Control Laws ... 37 By September
MG reported firm control of the situation and that "[no 1American goods

32BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/ 142--1/7, MG Weekly, July 3-20, 1945.
33BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 46. In this period
black market cases were handled by MG courts.
34Boelke 223.
35BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, Aug. 10-17, 1945.
36BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 46.
37BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 48.
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were in evidence." October reports concluded that large-scale black
market activity was over, although "the small peddler will continue to
operate as long as there are controlled items." MG was certain that "the
continued application of pressure" would prevent future black trade from
"getting out of hand."38 As far as MG was concerned, the situation was
under control, and subsequent reports give scant reference to any change
in the black market situation.
MG misjudged the strength of the black market. The black market
was by no means under control in the fall of 1945, and the "operators"
certainly not stagnant. Between September 1 and October 19, 1945, over
650 black marketeers were apprehended and sentenced in Munich, 39 an
average of 12-15 persons a day.40 This large figure also hints at the
violators who were never caught.
It was a "dubious" victory.41 Munich's black marketeers were
remarkably tough, flexible, and determined, and quickly adapted to the
situation.42 In reality, the black market had only been prodded from
public view. Dealings began to take place more and more behind closed
doors. Open-air locations remained for contact purposes;

poten~ial

38BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 49-50.
39chronik, 92; Siiddeutsche, Oct. 19, 1945, 3.
40suddeutsche, Oct. 19, 1945, 3. Of those 650 arrested, the
youngest was 13, the oldest 72. The number of young people and women
involved in the black market was in this period relatively small (3).
41Fuchs 114.
42Boelke 92.
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traders would meet to decide on the goods and the price, and then
conduct the actual business in a safe place.43 Munich's huge beer halls
were perfectly suited for completing or arranging transactions. Other
methods soon caught on: clever traders had much success by reappearing
immediately after a raid, and the defiant tactic became a common
practice.44 Some black marketeers organized their own bicycle patrols to
warn of impending raids. 45 MG officers were presumably aware of the
dubious environment. A black market investigation in September
revealed, for example, that "meat, vegetables, coffee, and cigarettes, are
being sold by the house-to-house canvassing method."46
The question remains whether MG really was concerned about, or
considered itself responsible for taming the black market. Confident
Munich MG soon left the task of combatting the black market to
relatively independent German police units. In July, the Munich police -in the midst of reorganization and working closely with US Military
Police -- had started to act against illicit trading by ordering its
somewhat unsure patrolmen to clear any public gathering in known
black market areas. 4 7 Soon MG demanded it do more, and advised the

43Fuchs 114.
44soelke 94.
45Fuchs 115.
46sayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, MG Report for Aug. 30 to Sept.
6, 1945.
4 7Boelke 94. On the Sendlinger Tor-Platz crowds seeking illegal
trading opportunities reached from 800 to 1 ,500 persons.
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police to set up a special branch (Sonderabteilung) for fighting the black
market. This unit began on September 1 under the direction of the new
Police Chief Pitzer. At first it was comprised of a meager 32 officials --for
a city of over 560,000 registered citizens.48
The special units contributed nevertheless to the apparent check
on black market activity. Yet the ability of the Munich police to combat
the black market was complicated by numerous dilemmas. Both the
sheer numbers of black marketeers and their cleverness in finding new
methods were difficult to control. MG restrained certain German
proposals for fighting black trade. In late September, for example, a plan
to declare it illegal, and punishable, for four or more persons to gather
was rejected by MG.49
German police au thortty enjoyed little respect. The following
example serves as illustration. As early as July 19, 1945, a Munich police
team -- 20 detectives and 25 patrolmen -- attempted a raid on the
Viktualienmarkt. The raid was a disaster from the beginning. A large group

of DPs approached the police vehicles before they even fully stopped,
pulled policemen out and attacked them. The police, after rescuing a
driver from the crowd and With a few suspects in custody, eventually fled
the scene under a barrage of stones. The raid resulted in only six arrests
and numerous wounded policemen. 50

48obermaier, and Maurer 73.
49Boelke 94.
5~uchs 116.
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The policeman's truncheon proved scarcely effective against the
more violent black marketeers. MG recognized this,51 but initially stuck
to its policy of putting off rearming the police. MG Public Safety Branch
officials blamed the German police for not handling the truncheon
effectively52 and attempted to strengthen the black market units by
calling for an increase in the number of personnel instead. Constant
pressure from police chief Pitzer as well as the continuing incidents of
police ineffectiveness eventually led MG to change its policy. 53
DPs proved an impossible challenge to German police. DPs were
commonly the most violent black marketeers, and also had the least
regard for German authority. German police assumed that most of the
main traders had established permanent inventories, and believed the DP
camps a major source. 54 German officials had no jurisdiction over DPs,
however, and could not enter their camps. This fact of life continued well
past the first months. In describing the situation near the Deutsches
Museum -- a prominant DP gathering spot and UNRRA camp -- the

following Munich police report expresses the pronounced lack of
leverage:55

51 Munich MG reports for the fall of 1945 repeatedly expressed this
concern.
52Boelke 223.
53Fuchs 116.
54Fuchs 115.
55Report from July 17, 1946 qtd. in Boelke 96 (this author's
translation).
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[DPs) believe that the German police are not allowed to intervene
against them. When German police do take action against them,
the DPs immedediately put up severe resistance, and do not back
down. This is why inteiVention led to nasty incidents evecy day.
Police were surrounded by packs, pelted with stones, and
threatened to be thrown in the Isar [river]. When in an emergency
policeman reach for the truncheon or the pistol, they are rudely
insulted as "Nazi police." Even the threat of the pistol alone
became impossible. When we attempted to check someone out for
black market trading, hundreds of [DPs] came out of the UNRRAcamp to back the suspect. Only in a few cases were German police
able to complete arrest and bring a suspect to the station. The
assistance of the milita:cy police brought little real improvement, so
that since May 1946 German patrols have discontinued activity in
the area.
The inability of the German police to act in DP matters allowed the
black market to flourish. The UNRRA camps, off limits to German police
and due to a lack of personnel and authority out of the influence of MG,
were a main source for this market. Relatively ample DP food rations
frequently ended up as black market merchandise. A MG officer assigned
to conduct a routine operations review of the Munich situation
considered UNRRA. management ofDP food stocks "terrible:"56
The food leakage from the warehouse at Munich distributing food
to DP camps is uncontrollable at the present time. It is well known
that this source constitutes the greatest black market activity and
the UNRRA officials are entirely responsible
The visiting officer regretted the fact that MG detachment personnel
could not take a more active role in controlling the situation:57
On account of redeployment it was necessa:cy to curtail [MG's]
checking of UNRRA operations because the Det ["detachment"] did
not have the personnel. It is not known what the percentage of
rations overdrawn is, but it is recognized that the black market

56BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 3.
57BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 3.
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from this source is increasing and the Det has no additional officer
personnel to assign this duty.
The premature victory over the black market

in

the fall of 1945 was

in reality the beginning of an increasingly worsening situation. This MG
assessment of Janumy 1946 practically acknowledged as much:58
There is still a Black Market in operation in Munich. It has,
however, gone underground and D.P.'s [sic] are the main culprits.
German police have no influence with these DPs, and consequently
UNRRA has its own police force to deal with them. In the last week
122 persons were arrested for Black Market, and 75 were D.P.s.
These figures do not portray the true percentages of D.P's and
Germans engaged in Black Market, however, as the German Police
are not able to arrest most of the former.
Huge black market raids increased. Over 125 were conducted in 1946,
leading to 3,803 arrests. 59 Moreover, increasing crime rates necessitated
concerted operations between MG, US military police and the German
police. MG was forced to assist in problematic DP matters. On November
10, 1946, for example, MG conducted a major raid at the DP camp on the
Leonrodstrqfie. 100 arrests were made, and numerous stocks of munitions

and provisions obtained from US Army depots, pillaged goods, and black
market items were seized.60
The black market dillemas of 1945 constituted only the start of a
major problem. Intensified enforcement and more effective police tactics
did not address the human issues at the heart of much black market
activity. Social and psychological problems such as hunger, fear, ill

58BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/3, MG Monthly for Januacy 1946,
1.

59chronik, 226.
60chronik 210.
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regard and uncertainty would get much worse after 1945 before they
improved. Only with the scant but promising optimism brought on by the
Currency Reform of 1948 did the black market itself begin to wane.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It is a wonder US MG detachments achieved what they did under

the complex and chaotic conditions they faced in the spring, summer,
and fall of 1945. US MG revealed a checkered ability to establish ·its own
authority and control affairs, but in an important area like Munich
completed its goals with admirable efficiency. As MG gave up the
constant and direct control of German affairs early in the occupation, it
could only accomplish a limited amount. German authorities still had a
long stretch of hardship and growth before they reached effective
credibility and capability. The first year of the occupation constituted a
purposeful beginning, but a precarious one as well.
The issues described in these pages were crucial, and greatly helped
determine the course of the occupation and the directions of German
postwar development. Formidable human suffering, supply concerns,
infrastructure breakdown and the lack of credible German authority
nagged at the efforts to begin anew. Fueled by anger, revenge, hunger,
need and greed, threatening lawbreakers consistently challenged MG and
German authorities' efforts to establish themselves. To a certain extent,
only time could really heal many ·crtme problems. Such critical issues
could only be solved by fundamental improvements in the post-war
environment; by stabilization of the food supply, a stable currency, a
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rejuvenated system and a hopeful populace. In 10 years' time from 1945,
US occupation authorities would still be commonplace in Southern
Bavaria, yet the sor:cy state of things was much transformed. The
horrific, chaotic conditions could not last indefinitely. The effects would,
however, last lifetimes.
The period emphasized in this work constituted the "incubation
stage" of postwar Germany. Modern Munich, Southern Bavaria, and all
of Germany are today still vecy much direct progeny of those hard
formative years. The aftermath of the century's most unforgiving war and
the ensuing occupation led to results that were mostly new for Germans,
in some aspects continuous With the pre-Nazi past, and in others
remarkably akin to issues today. The German press has regained its
identity, but that identity is today much closer to the Anglo-Saxon
model than it was before the war. Modern German police do not still
dress like Chicago policemen, nor are they directly responsible to their
municipality as US planners intended them to be. Yet they do serve the
citizens and they uphold their constitution, the Grundgesetz. Providing
for masses of once enslaved Displaced Persons is no more a problem in
Germany-- or is it? Despite recent laws, German officials and politicians
grapple daily With a constant influx of refugees and asylum-seeking
aliens. The sudden economic prosperity of the 1950s' Wirtschajtswunder
dealt the final blow to many of the economic and social problems caused
by the war and during the occupation period -- or did it? The examples,
comparisons and questions go on ad infinitum, but the source is the
same; the process was defined in the chaotic early months of the US
occupation.
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In this "incubation stage" of the occupation the United States
assumed the role of conqueror and was soon forced to grow into an
international master. In assuring law and order, US officials were forced
for the first time to fully assume the "world's policemen" role they are
recognized for today. US Militacy Government experiences such as those
detailed in these pages provided significant lessons for the new role.
These considerations bring us back to the introduction of this
work, and what this thesis was meant to achieve. I sought to illustrate
how US Militacy Government established authority and directed law and
order in a given area, and determine the challenges involved. This work
does not attempt to be the last word on this subject, but rather attempts
to raise and define valid questions about it. Many researchable issues are
raised in these pages, but the method of managing them is also an issue.
This study puts them on the table. As it turned out, there were many
challenges in attempting to document such a confused and volatile
period and subject. Hopefully the effort offers some rewards in return.
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